Cuban Missile Crisis: Related Documents

Discovery of the Missiles

Document #1 - document #16 from Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1961-1963, vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, which summarizes the information gathered by a U-2 aircraft about the Soviet emplacement of missiles in Cuba and the initial reactions of McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/frusXI/01_25.html

16. Editorial Note

On the morning of October 14, 1962, a U-2 aircraft, piloted by Air Force Maj. Richard D. Heyser, flew a reconnaissance mission over the western part of Cuba, flying from south to north. The 928 photographs obtained during the 6-minute flight over the island produced the first verified evidence of the existence of Soviet offensive missile sites in Cuba. Analysis and interpretation of the photographs at the National Photographic Intelligence Center revealed that three medium-range ballistic missile sites were being developed near San Cristobal, in Pinar del Rio province. Photo analysts counted eight large MRBM transporters at the three locations and four erector launchers in tentative firing positions. Two further U-2 missions, flown on October 15 by pilots of the Strategic Air Command, revealed a fourth MRBM site near San Cristobal, and two intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) sites were discovered at Guanajay. Photos also revealed 21 crates for Soviet IL-28 Beagle medium-range bomber aircraft at San Julian airfield. (Chronology of Air Force Actions During the Cuban Crisis, 14 October-30 October 1962; USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, pages 11-12)

At 8:30 p.m. on October 15, CIA Deputy Director Carter reported to McGeorge Bundy the hard evidence of the MRBM's, but the President's Special Assistant decided not to notify the President that evening. In a memorandum to the President, dated March 4, 1963, Bundy explained his reasons for this decision:

"1. This was very big news, and its validity would need to be demonstrated clearly to you and others before action could be taken. The blow-ups and other elements of such a presentation would not be ready before morning. I was satisfied that the word was going out quietly to those with an immediate need to know. The one obvious operational need was for more photography, and that was in hand.

"2. It was a hell of a secret, and it must remain one until you had a chance to deal with it. Thus everything should go on as nearly normally as possible, in particular there should be no hastily summoned meeting Monday night. Chip Bohlen and I, for example, should not leave a dinner at my house where there were knowledgeable foreign guests, and others, I knew, were in the same spot.

"3. On the other hand this was not something that could be dealt with on the phone except in the most limited and cryptic terms. What help would it be to you to give you this piece of news and then tell you nothing could be done about it till morning?

"4. Finally, I had heard that you were tired. You had had a strenuous campaign week end, returning from Niagara Falls and New York City at 1:40 Monday morning.

"5. So I decided that a quiet evening and a night of sleep were the best preparation you could have in the light of what would face you in the next days. I would, I think, decide the same again unless you tell me different." (Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Cuba--Subjects Current)

Bundy prints this memorandum in Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years, pages 684-685.

Document #2 - hardcopy of reconnaissance photo

Caption: On October 14, 1962, U.S. officials first learned of the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba when a U-2 spy plane photographed Soviet medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) sites on the island. This photograph shows the second set of MRBMs found in Cuba, a site subsequently named San Cristobal no. 1.

Document #3 - hardcopy of reconnaissance photo

Caption: Other surveillance photographs later document additional Soviet missile installations and the pace of Soviet preparations. This low-level photograph of San Cristobal no. 1, taken by the U.S. Navy on October 23, 1962, indicated that fuel tank trailers, a missile shelter tent, and other equipment had been introduced into the area since the first U-2 photos of October 14. Moreover, the extensive vehicle trackage, coupled with the construction of cable lines to control areas, highlighted the tempo of Soviet activity.

The ExComm Deliberates

Document #4 - document #18 from FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath--a transcript of the first meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, held on the morning of October 16, during which President Kennedy's key advisers discussed what to do in response to the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba:

http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/frusXI/01_25.html

18. Transcript of a Meeting at the White House

Washington, October 16, 1962, 11:50 a.m.

Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Presidential Recordings, Transcripts. No classification marking. The source text is a 35-page transcript of audiotape 28.1. Identifying footnotes in the source text are not included. For Taylor's draft account of this meeting, October 16, including a list of participants, and Carter's memorandum for the record, dictated on October 17, see the Supplement. Carter's memorandum also is reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 145-147. McGeorge Bundy had informed the President about the U-2 photographs of the missile sites at 8:45 a.m. October 16, and Kennedy immediately called for a meeting of his principal advisers at 11:45.

[Here follows 7-1/2 pages of the transcript, which narrate the analysis of the U-2 photographs.]

JFK: Secretary Rusk?

Rusk: Yes. [Well?],/1/ Mr. President, this is a, of course, a [widely?] serious development. It's one that we, all of us, had not really believed the Soviets could, uh, carry this far. Uh, they, uh, seemed to be denying that they were going to establish bases of their own [in the same?] [words unintelligible] with a Soviet base, thus making it [essential to or essentially?] Cuban point of view. The Cubans couldn't [word unintelligible] with it anyhow, so. . . . Now, um, I do think we have to set in motion a chain of events that will eliminate this base. I don't think we [can?] sit still. The questioning becomes whether we do it by sudden, unannounced strike of some sort, or we, uh, build up the crisis to the point where the other side has to consider very seriously about giving in, or, or even the Cubans themselves, uh, take some, take some action on this. The thing that I'm, of course, very conscious of is that there is no such thing, I think, as unilateral action by the United States. It's so [eminently or heavily?] involved with 42 allies and confrontation in many places, that any action that we take, uh, will greatly increase the risks of direct action involving, uh, our other alliances and our other forces in other parts of the world. Um, so I think we, we have to think very hard about two major, uh, courses of action as alternatives. One is the quick strike. The point where we [make or think?], that is the, uh, overwhelming, overriding necessity to take all the risks that are involved doing that. I don't think this in itself would require an invasion of Cuba. I think that with or without such an invasion, in other words if we make it clear that, uh, what we're doing is eliminating this particular base or any other such base that is established. We ourselves are not moved to general war, we're simply doing what we said we would do if they took certain action. Uh, or we're going to decide that this is the time to eliminate the Cuban problem by actually eliminating the island.

/1/All brackets except those citing declassification excisions and unrelated material are in the source text.

The other would be, if we have a few days--from the military point of view, if we have the whole time--uh, then I would think that, uh, there would be another course of action, a combination of things that, uh, we might wish to consider. Um, first, uh, that we, uh, stimulate the OAS procedure immediately for prompt action to make it quite clear that the entire hemisphere considers that the Rio Pact has been violated [and actually?] what acts should [we take or be taken?] in, under the terms of the Rio Pact. The OAS could constitute itself an organ of consultation promptly, although maybe, it may take two or three days to get, uh, instructions from governments and things of that sort. The OAS could, I suppose, at any moment, uh, take action to insist to the Cubans that an OAS inspection, uh, team be permitted to come and, itself, look directly at these sites, provide assurance[s?] to the hemisphere. That will undoubtedly be turned down, but it will be another step in building up the, uh, building a position.

I think also that we ought to consider getting some word to Castro, perhaps through the Canadian ambassador in Havana or through, uh, his representative at the U.N. Uh, I think perhaps the Canadian ambassador would be the best, the better channel to get to Castro [apart?] privately and tell him that, uh, this is no longer support for Cuba, that Cuba is being victimized here, and that, uh, the Soviets are preparing Cuba for destruction or betrayal.

You saw the Times story yesterday morning that high Soviet officials were saying, "We'll trade Cuba for Berlin." This ought to be brought to Castro's attention. It ought to be said to Castro that, uh, uh, this kind of a base is intolerable and not acceptable. The time has now come when he must take the interests of the Cuban people, must now break clearly with the Soviet Union, prevent this missile base from becoming operational.

And I think there are certain military, um, uh, actions that we could, we might well want to take straight away. First, to, uh, to call up, uh, highly selective units [no more than?] 150,000. Unless we feel that it's better, more desirable to go to a general national emergency so that we have complete freedom of action. If we announce, at the time that we announce this development--and I think we do have to announce this development some time this week--uh, we announce that, uh, we are conducting a surveillance of Cuba, over Cuba, and we will enforce our right to do so. We reject the mission of secrecy in this hemisphere in any matters of this sort. We, we reinforce our forces in Guantanamo. We reinforce our forces in the southeastern part of the United States--whatever is necessary from the military point of view to be able to give, to deliver an overwhelming strike at any of these installations, including the SAM sites. And, uh, also to take care of any, uh, MIGs or bombers that might make a pass at Miami or at the United States. Build up heavy forces, uh, if those are not already in position.

That, uh, we then would move openly and vigorously into the, into the guerrilla field, and, uh, create maximum confusion on the island. [You know?] won't be too squeemish at this point about the overtness, covert [counter?] [word unintelligible] of what is being done.

We review our attitude on, an alternative Cuban government. We get Miro Cardona and his group in, Manuel Rey and his group, and see if they won't get together on a progressive junta. Uh, that would pretty well combine all principal elements, other than the Batista group, as the leaders of Cuba. And, uh, have them, give them more of a status, whether we proceed to full recognition or not is something else, but get, get the Cuban elements highly organized on this matter.

I think also that we need a few days, um, to alert our other allies, for consultation with NATO. I'll assume that we can move on this line at the same time to interrupt all air traffic from free world countries going into Cuba, insist to the Mexicans, the Dutch, that they stop their planes from coming in. Tell the British, who, and anyone else who's involved at this point, that, uh, if they're interested in peace, they've got to stop their ships from Cuban trade at this point. Uh, in other words, isolate Cuba completely without at this particular moment a, uh, a forceful blockade.

I think it would be important to use the, uh, consider, uh, calling in General Eisenhower, giving him a full briefing before a public announcement is made as to the situation and the [forcible?] action which you might determine upon.

But I think that, by and large, there are, there are these two broad alternatives: one, the quick strike; the other, to alert our allies and Mr. Khrushchev that there is utterly serious crisis in the making here, and that, uh . . . Mr. Khrushchev may not himself really understand that or believe that at this point. I think we'll be facing a situation that could well lead to general war; that we have an obligation to do what has to be done but do it in a way that gives, uh, everybody a chance to, uh, put the [word unintelligible] down before it gets too hard. Those are my, my reactions of this morning, Mr. President. I naturally need to think about this very hard for the next several hours, uh, what I and what my colleagues at the State Department can do about it.

McNamara: Mr. President, there are a number of unknowns in this situation I want to comment upon, and, in relation to them, I would like to outline very briefly some possible military alternatives and ask General Taylor to expand upon them.

But before commenting on either the unknowns or outlining some military alternatives, there are two propositions I would suggest that we ought to accept as, uh, foundations for our further thinking. My first is that if we are to conduct an air strike against these installations, or against any part of Cuba, we must agree now that we will schedule that prior to the time these missile sites become operational. I'm not prepared to say when that will be, but I think it is extremely important that our talk and our discussion be founded on this premise: that any air strike will be planned to take place prior to the time they become operational. Because, if they become operational before the air strike, I do not believe we can state we can knock them out before they can be launched; and if they're launched there is almost certain to be, uh, chaos in part of the east coast or the area, uh, in a radius of six hundred to a thousand miles from Cuba.

Uh, secondly, I, I would submit the proposition that any air strike must be directed not solely against the missile sites, but against the missile sites plus the airfields plus the aircraft which may not be on the airfields but hidden by that time plus all potential nuclear storage sites. Now, this is a fairly extensive air strike. It is not just a strike against the missile sites; and there would be associated with it potential casualties of Cubans, not of U.S. citizens, but potential casualties of Cubans in, at least in the hundreds, more likely in the low thousands, say two or three thousand. It seems to me these two propositions, uh, should underlie our, our discussion.

Now, what kinds of military action are we capable of carrying out and what may be some of the consequences? Uh, we could carry out an air strike within a matter of days. We would be ready for the start of such an air strike within, within a matter of days. If it were absolutely essential, it could be done almost literally within a matter of hours. I believe the chiefs would prefer that it be deferred for a matter of days, but we are prepared for that quickly. The air strike could continue for a matter of days following the initial day, if necessary. Uh, presumably there would be some political discussions taking place either just before the air strike or both before and during. In any event, we would be prepared, following the air strike, for an air, invasion, both by air and by sea. Approximately seven days after the start of the air strike, that would be possible if the political environment made it desirable or necessary at that time. [Fine?] Associated with this air strike undoubtedly should be some degree of mobilization. Uh, I would think of the mobilization coming not before the air strike but either concurrently with or somewhat following, say possibly five days afterwards, depending upon the possible invasion requirements. The character of the mobilization would be such that it could be carried out in its first phase at least within the limits of the authority granted by Congress. There might have to be a second phase, and then it would require a declaration of a national emergency.

Now, this is very sketchily the military, uh, capabilities, and I think you may wish to hear General Taylor, uh, outline his choice.

Speaker?: Almost too [words unintelligible] to Cuba.

Speaker?: Yes. Taylor: Uh, we're impressed, Mr. President, with the great importance of getting a, a strike with all the benefit of surprise, uh, which would mean ideally that we would have all the missiles that are in Cuba above ground where we can take them out. Uh, that, that desire runs counter to the strong point the Secretary made if the other optimum would be to get every missile before it could, becomes operational. Uh, practically, I think the, our knowledge of the timing of the readiness is going to be so, so, uh, difficult that we'll never have the, the exact permanent, uh, the perfect timing. What we'd like to do is to look at this new photography, I think--and take any additional--and try to get the, the layout of the targets in as near an optimum, uh, position as possible, and then take 'em out without any warning whatsoever. That does not preclude, I don't think, Mr. Secretary, some of the things you've been talking about. It's a little hard to say in terms of time how much I'm discussing. But we must do a good job the first time we go in there, uh, pushing a 100 percent just as far, as closely as we can with our, with our strike. I'm having all the responsible planners in this afternoon, Mr. President, at four o'clock, to talk this out with 'em and get their best judgment.

I would also mention among the, the military actions we should take that once we have destroyed as many of these offensive weapons as possible, we should, should prevent any more coming in, which means a naval blockade. So I suppose that all . . . . And also a reinforcement of Guantanamo and evacuation of dependents. So, really, the, in point of time, I'm, I'm thinking in terms of three phases.

One, a, an initial pause of some sort while we get completely ready and get, get the right posture on the part of the target, so we can do the best job. Then, virtually concurrently, an air strike against, as the Secretary said, missiles, airfields, uh, unclear sites that we know of. At the same time, naval blockade. At the same time, reinforce Guantanamo and evacuate the dependents. I'd then start this continuous reconnaissance, the list that you had, continue over Cuba.

Then, then the decision can be made as we, as we're mobilizing, uh, with the air strike as to whether we invade or not. I think that's the hardest question militarily in the whole business--one which we should look at very closely before we get our feet in that deep mud in Cuba.

Rusk: There are st-, one or two things, Mr. President, uh. Gromyko asked to see you Thursday. Uh, it may be of some interest to know what he says about this, if he says anything. He may be bringing a message on this subject. Uh, but that. . . . I just want to remind you that you are seeing him and that may be relevant to this [topic?]. I might say incidentally, sir, that you delay anything else you have to do at this point.

Secondly, I don't believe, myself, that the critical question is whether you get a particular missile before it goes off because if they shoot those missiles we are in general nuclear war. In other words, the Soviet Union has got quite a different decision to make. If they, if they shoot those missiles, want to shoot 'em off before they get knocked out by aircraft. . . . So, I'm not sure that this is, uh, necessarily the precise [critical?] element, Bob.

McNamara: Well, I would strongly emphasize that I think our time should be based on the assumption it is, Dean. We don't know what kinds of communications the Soviets have with those sites. We don't know what kinds of control they have over the warheads.

Rusk: Yes, [words unintelligible] . . .

McNamara: If we saw a warhead on the site and we knew that that launcher was capable of launching that warhead, I would . . . . Frankly, I would strongly urge against the air attack, to be quite frank about it, because I think the danger to this country in relation to the gain that would accrue with the excessive [time?]. . . . This is why I suggest that if we're talking about an air attack, I believe we should consider it only on the assumption that we can carry if off before these become operational.

JFK: What is the, uh, advant- . . . . Must be some major reason for the Russians to, uh, set this up as a . . . . Must be that they're not satisfied with their ICBMs. What'd be the reason that they would, uh . . . .

Taylor: What it'd give 'em is primary, it makes the launching base, uh, for short range missiles against the United States to supplement their rather [deceptive?] ICBM system, for example. There's one reason.

JFK: Of course, I don't see how we could prevent further ones from coming in by submarine.

Taylor: Well, I think that that thing is all over . . .

JFK: I mean if we let 'em blockade the thing, they come in by submarine.

McNamara: Well, I think the only way to prevent them coming in, quite frankly, is to say you'll take them out the moment they come in. You'll take them out and you'll carry on open surveillance and you'll have a policy to take them out if they come in. I think it's really rather unrealistic to think that we could carry out an air attack of the kind we're talking about. We're talking about an air attack of several hundred sorties because we don't know where these airplanes are.

Bundy: Are you absolutely clear of your premise that an air strike must go to the whole air complex?

McNamara: Well, we are, Mac . . .

Bundy: . . . air complex? [Appears to be a repeat of the words above.]

McNamara: . . . because we are fearful of these MIG 21s. We don't know where they are. We don't know what they're capable of. If there are nuclear warheads associated with the launchers, you must assume there will be nuclear warheads associated with aircraft. Even if there are not nuclear warheads associated with aircraft, you must assume that those aircraft have high explosive potential. We have a serious air defense problem. We're not prepared to report to you exactly, uh, what the Cuban air force is capable of; but I think we must assume that the Cuban air force is definitely capable of penetrating, in small numbers, our coastal air defense by coming in low over the water. And I would think that we would not dare go in against the missile sites, knock those out leaving intact Castro's air force, and run the risk that he would use part or all of that air force against our coastal areas--either with or without nuclear weapons. It would be a, a very heavy price to pay in U.S. lives for the, the damage we did to Cuba.

Rusk: Still, about why the Soviets are doing this, um, Mr. McCone suggested some weeks ago that one thing Mr. Khrushchev may have in mind is that, uh, uh, he knows that we have a substantial nuclear superiority, but he also knows that we don't really live under fear of his nuclear weapons to the extent that, uh, he has to live under fear of ours. Also we have nuclear weapons nearby, in Turkey and places like that. Um. . . .

JFK: How many weapons do we have in Turkey?

Taylor?: We have Jupiter missiles . . .

Bundy?: Yeah. We have how many?

McNamara?: About fifteen, I believe it is.

Bundy?: I think that's right. I think that's right.

Speaker?: [Words unintelligible]

Rusk: But then there are also delivery vehicles that are, could easily . . .

McNamara: Aircraft.

Rusk: . . . be moved through the air, aircraft and so forth.

Speaker?: Route 'em through Turkey.

Rusk: Um, and that Mr. McCone expresses the view that Khrushchev may feel that it's important for us to learn about living under medium-range missiles, and he's doing that to sort of balance that, uh, that political, psychological [plank?]. I think also that, uh, Berlin is, uh, very much involved in this. Um, for the first time, I'm beginning really to wonder whether maybe Mr. Khrushchev is entirely rational about Berlin. We've [hardly?] talked about his obsession with it. And I think we have to, uh, keep our eye on that element. But, uh, they may be thinking that they can either bargain Berlin and Cuba against each other, or that they could provoke us into a kind of action in Cuba which would give an umbrella for them to take action with respect to Berlin. In other words like the Suez-Hungary combination. If they could provoke us into taking the first overt action, then the world would be confused and they would have, uh, what they would consider to be justification for making a move somewhere else. But, uh, I must say I don't really see the rationality of, uh, the Soviets pushing it this far unless they grossly misunderstand the importance of Cuba to this country.

Bundy: It's important, I think, to recognize that they did make this decision, as far as our estimates now go, in early summer, and, this has been happening since August. Their TASS statement of September 12, which the experts, I think, attribute very strongly to Khrushchev himself, is all mixed up on this point. It has a rather explicit statement, "The harmless military equipment sent to Cuba designed exclusively for defense, defensive purposes. The President of the United States and the American military, the military of any country know what means of defense are. How can these means threaten United States?"

Now there, it's very hard to reconcile that with what has happened. The rest, as the Secretary says, has many comparisons between Cuba and Italy, Turkey and Japan. We have other evidence that Khrushchev is, honestly believes, or, or at least affects to believe that we have nuclear weapons in, in Japan, that combination, [word unintelligible] . . .

Rusk: Gromyko stated that in his press conference the other day, too.

Bundy: Yeah. They may mean Okinawa.

Speaker?: Right.

McNamara: It's not likely, but it's conceivable the nuclear warheads for these launchers are not yet on Cuban soil.

Bundy: Now that seems to me that's . . . . It's perfectly possible that this, that they are in that sense a bluff. That doesn't make them any less offensive to us . . .

McNamara: No.

Bundy: . . . because we can't have proof about it.

McNamara: No, but it does possibly indicate a different course of action . . .

Bundy: Yeah.

McNamara: . . . and therefore, while I'm not suggesting how we should handle this, I think this is one of the most important actions we should take: to ascertain the location of the nuclear warheads for these missiles. Later in the discussion we can revert back to this. There are several alternative ways of approaching it.

JFK: Doug, do you have any . . . .

Dillon: No. The only thing I'd, would say is that, uh, this alternative course of, of warning, getting, uh, public opinion, uh, OAS action and telling people in NATO and everything like that, would appear to me to have the danger of, uh, getting us wide out in the open and forcing the Russians to, uh, Soviets to take a, a position that if anything was done, uh, they would, uh, have to retaliate. Whereas, uh, a, a quick action, uh, with a statement at the same time saying this is all there is to it, might give them a chance to, uh, back off and not do anything. Meanwhile, I think that the chance of getting through this thing without a Russian reaction is greater under a quick, uh, strike than, uh, building the whole thing up to a, a climax then going through. . . . [It will be a lot of debate on it?]

Rusk: That is, of course, a possibility, but, uh. . . .

Bundy: The difficulties--I, I share the Secretary of the Treasury's feeling a little bit--the difficulties of organizing the OAS and NATO; the amount of noise we would get from our allies saying that, uh, they can live with Soviet MRBMs, why can't we; uh, the division in the alliance; the certainty that the Germans would feel that we were jeopardizing Berlin because of our concern over Cuba. The prospect of that pattern is not an appetizing one . . .

Rusk: Yes, but you see . . .

Bundy: . . . [Words unintelligible]

Rusk: . . . uh, uh, everything turns crucially on what happens.

Bundy: I agree, Mr. Secretary.

Rusk: And if we go with the quick strike, then, in fact, they do back it up, then you've exposed all of your allies [word unintelligible], ourselves to all these great dangers without . . .

Bundy: You get all these noises again.

Rusk: . . . without, uh, the slightest consultation or, or warning or preparation.

JFK: But, of course, warning them, uh, it seems to me, is warning everybody. And I, I, obviously you can't sort of announce that in four days from now you're going to take them out. They may announce within three days they're going to have warheads on 'em; if we come and attack, they're going to fire them. Then what'll, what'll we do? Then we don't take 'em out. Of course, we then announce, well, if they do that, then we're going to attack with nuclear weapons.

Dillon: Yes, sir, that's the question that nobody, I didn't understand, nobody had mentioned, is whether this s-, uh, "take-out," this mission, uh, was [word unintelligible] to deal with . . .

Speaker?: I don't know.

Dillon: . . . high explosives?

Speaker?: High explosives, yes.

JFK: How effective can the take-out be, do they think?

Taylor?: It'll never be a 100 percent, Mr. President, we know. Uh, we hope to take out a vast majority in the first strike, but this is not just one thing, one strike, one day, but continuous air attack for whenever necessary, whenever we di-, discover a target.

Bundy: They're now talking about taking out the air force as well. . . .

Speaker?: I [could tell you that in the staff?].

Speaker?: [Words unintelligible]

Bundy: I do raise again the question whether, uh, whether we [words unintelligible] the problem, military problem, but there is, I would think, a substantial political advantage in limiting the strike in surgical terms to the thing that is in fact the cause of action.

McNamara?: I suggest, Mr. President, that if you're involved in several hundred strikes, this is what you would--and against airfields--this is what you would do, pre-invade. And, uh, it would be very difficult to convince anybody that this was not a pre-invasion strike. I think also once you get this volume of attack that public opinion reaction, uh, to this, as distinct from the reaction to an invasion, uh, there's [word unintelligible] little difference. And, uh, from both standpoints, it would seem to me that if you're talking about a, a general air attack program, you might as well think about whether we can eradicate the whole problem by an invasion just as simply with as little chance of reaction.

Taylor: Well, I would think we would have, should be in a position to invade at any time if we so desired. Hence that, uh, in this preliminary, we should be, uh, it's all bonus if we are indeed taking out weapons [word unintelligible] . . .

JFK: Well, let's say we just take out the missile bases, then, uh, they have some more there. Obviously they can get 'em in by submarine and so on, I don't know whether you, you just can't keep high strikes on.

Taylor: I suspect, Mr. President, we'd have to take out the surface-to-air missiles in order to get in, to get in, take some of them out. Maybe [words unintelligible].

JFK: How long will, do we estimate this will remain secure, this, uh, information, uh, people have it?

Bundy: In terms of the tightness of our intelligence control, Mr. President, I think we are in unusually and fortunately good position. We set up a, uh, new security classification governing precisely the field of offensive capability in Cuba just five days ago, four days ago, under General Carter. That, uh, limits this, uh, to people who have an immediate, operational necessity in intelligence terms to work on the data and the people who have . . .

JFK: How many would that be, about?

Bundy: Oh, that will be a very large number, but that's not generally where leaks come from. Uh, the more [important?] limitation is that only officers with the policy responsibility for advice directly to you'll receive this . . .

JFK: How many would get it over in the Defense Department, General, with your meeting this afternoon?

Taylor: Well, I was going to mention that. We'd have to ask for relaxation of the ground rules, uh, that, that Mac has just enunciated, so that I can, uh, give it to the senior commanders who are involved in the plans.

JFK: Would that be about fifty?

Taylor: By then. . . . No, sir. I would say that, uh, within, at this stage ten more.

McNamara: Well, Mr. President, I, I think, to be realistic, we should assume that this will become fairly widely known, if not in the newspapers, at least by political representatives of both parties within--I would, I'm just picking a figure--I'd say a week.

[Several speakers speak at once and none of the words are intelligible.]

McNamara: And I say that because we have, we have taken action already that is raising questions in people's minds. Normally, when a U-2 comes back, we duplicate the films. The duplicated copies go to a series of commands. A copy goes to SAC. A copy goes to CINCLANT. A copy goes to CIA. And normally, uh, the photo interpreters and the, and the operational officers in these commands are looking forward to these. We have stopped all that, and this, this type of information is going on throughout the department. And I, I doubt very much that we can keep this out of the hands of, uh, of members of Congress, for example, for more than a week.

Rusk: Well, Senator Keating has already, in effect, announced it on the floor of the Senate.

Bundy: Senator Keating said this on the floor of the Senate on the tenth of October . . .

Rusk: [That's correct?]

Bundy: . . . "Construction has begun on at least a half-dozen launching sites for intermediate range tactical missiles."

Rusk: Well, that's, that's the way that [words unintelligible]. I think we can count on announcing it not later than Thursday or Friday of this week.

Taylor?: There is a refugee who's a major source of intelligence on this, of course, who has described one of these missiles in terms which we can recognize, who is now in this country.

JFK: Is he the one who's giving Keating his stuff?

Taylor?: We don't know.

Bundy: My question, Mr. President, is whether as a matter of, uh, tactics we ought not to interview Senator Keating and check out his data. Seems to me that that ought to be done in a routine sort of way by an open officer of the intelligence agency.

Speaker?: I think that's [right?].

JFK: You have any thoughts, Mr. Vice President?

Johnson: I agree with Mac that that ought to be done. I think that, uh, we're committed at any time that we feel that there's a build up that in any way endangers to take whatever action we must take to assure our security. I would think the Secretary's evaluation of this thing being around all over the lot is a pretty accurate one, I would think it'd take a week to do it. Maybe a little before then.

I would, uh, like to hear what the responsible commanders have to say this afternoon. I think the question with the base is whether we take it out or whether we talk about it, and, uh, both, either alternative is a very distressing one, but of the two, I would take it out.

JFK: Well, uh, the, uh . . .

Johnson: Assuming these commanders felt that way. I'm fearful if we . . . . I spent the weekend with the ambassadors of the Organization of American States. I think this organization is fine, but I don't think, I don't rely on 'em much for any strength in anything like this. And, I, the fact that we're talking about our other allies, uh, I take the position that Mr. Bundy says, We ought to be living all these years with [words unintelligible] get your blood pressure up. But the fact is the country's blood pressure is up and they are fearful, and they're insecure, and we're getting divided, and, uh, I don't think that, uh . . . . I take this little State Department Bulletin that you sent out to all the congressmen. One, one of the points you make--that any time the build up endangers or threatens our security in any way, we're going to do whatever must be done immediately to protect our own security. And when you say that, why the, give unanimous support. People are really concerned about this, in my opinion. Uh, I think we have to be prudent and cautious, talk to the commanders and see what they say, what they're . . . . [I'm] not much for circularizing it over the Hill or our allies, even though I realize it's a breach of faith. It's the one not to confer with them. We're not going to get much help out of them.

Bundy: There is an intermediate position. There are perhaps two or three of our principal allies or heads of government we could communicate, at least on a 24-hour notice basis. Certainly ease, ease the . . .

Johnson: [Take a large?] [words unintelligible] [to?] stop the planes, stop the ships, stop the submarines and everything else from [sending?]. Just not going to permit it. And then stop them from coming in.

Speaker?: Yeah.

JFK: Uh, eh, well, this, which . . . . What you're really talking about are two or three different, uh, [tense?] operations. One is the strike just on this, these three bases. One, the second is the broader one that Secretary McNamara was talking about, which is on the airfields and on the SAM sites and on anything else connected with, uh, missiles. Third is doing both of those things and also at the same time launching a blockade, which requires really the, uh, the, uh, third and which is a larger step. And then, as I take it, the fourth question is the, uh, degree of consultation. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Speaker?: Um.

JFK: Just have to [words unintelligible] and do it. Probably ought to tell them, though, the night before.

RFK: Mr. President.

JFK: Yes.

RFK: We have the fifth one, really, which is the invasion. I would say that, uh, you're dropping bombs all over Cuba if you do the second, uh, air, the airports, knocking out their planes, dropping it on all their missiles. You're covering most of Cuba. You're going to kill an awful lot of people, and, uh, we're going to take an awful lot of heat on it . . .

Speaker?: Yeah.

RFK: . . . and, uh, and then, uh, you know, the heat, you're going to announce the reason that you're doing it is because, uh, they're sending in these kind of missiles. Well, I would think it's almost incumbent upon the Russians, then, to say, Well, we're going to send them in again, and if you do it again, we're going to do, we're going to do the same thing to Turkey, or We're going to do the same thing to Iran.

[Here follow 5 pages of discussion of which targets might be attacked.]

JFK: I think we ought to, what we ought to do is, is, uh, after this meeting this afternoon, we ought to meet tonight again at six, consider these various, uh, proposals. In the meanwhile, we'll go ahead with this maximum, whatever is needed from the flights, and, in addition, we will . . . . I don't think we got much time on these missiles. They may be . . . . So it may be that we just have to, we can't wait two weeks while we're getting ready to, to roll. Maybe just have to just take them out, and continue our other preparations if we decide to do that. That may be where we end up. I think we ought to, beginning right now, be preparing to. . . . Because that's what we're going to do anyway. We're certainly going to do number one; we're going to take out these, uh, missiles. Uh, the questions will be whether, which, what I would describe as number two, which would be a general air strike. That we're not ready to say, but we should be in preparation for it. The third is the, is the, uh, the general invasion. At least we're going to do number one, so it seems to me that we don't have to wait very long. We, we ought to be making those preparations.

Bundy: You want to be clear, Mr. President, whether we have definitely decided against a political track. I, myself, think we ought . . .

Taylor?: Well, we'll have . . .

Bundy: . . . to work out a contingency on that.

Taylor?: We, we'll develop both tracks.

JFK: [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] We ought to just decide who we talk to and how long ahead and how many people, really, in the government. There's going to be a difference between those who know that--this will leak out in the next few days--there are these, uh, uh, bases, until we say or the Pentagon or State won't be harsh. We've already said it on the [words unintelligible]. So we, let's say, we've got two or three days.

Bundy: Well, let's play it, shall we play it still harder and, uh, simply say that there's no evidence and that we have to . . .

JFK: We ought to stick the battle till we want to do something.

Bundy: . . . [words unintelligible] the alliance [words unintelligible].

JFK: Otherwise we give ourselves away, so let's . . .

Bundy: May I make one other cover plan suggestion . . .

JFK: Yes.

Bundy: . . . Mr. President? There will be meetings in the White House. I think the best we can do is to keep the people with a specific Latin American business black and describe the rest as "intensive budget review sessions," but I haven't been able to think of any other . . .

JFK: Nobody, it seems to me, in the State Department. I discussed the matter with, uh, Bohlen of the Soviet bloc and told him he could talk to Thompson. So that's those two. It seems to me that there's no one else in the State Department that ought to be talked to about it . . .

Speaker?: [Words unintelligible] in the department.

JFK: . . . in any level at all, and, uh, until we know a little more. And then, as I say, in Defense we've got to keep it as tight as possible . . .

Speaker?: [Words unintelligible]

JFK: . . . particularly what we're going to do about it. Maybe a lot of people know about what's there, but what we're going to do about it really ought to be, you know, the tightest of all because otherwise we botch it up.

McNamara: Mr. President, may I suggest that we come back this afternoon prepared to, to answer three questions. First, should we surface our surveillance? I think this is a very important . . .

Speaker?: Very important point.

McNamara: . . . question at the moment. We ought to try to decide today either yes or no.

JFK: By "surface our" . . .

McNamara: I mean should we state publicly . . .

JFK?: Oh.

McNamara: . . . that, that you have stated we will, we'll act to take out any offensive weapons. In order to be certain as to whether there are or are not offensive weapons, we are scheduling U-2 flights or other surveillance . . .

Carter?: What's the [skull number, commissar?]. [Laughs]

McNamara: . . . or reconnaissance flights to, uh, to obtain this information. We'll make the information, uh, public.

JFK: There may not be one. All right, why not?

McNamara: This is one question. A second question is: Should we precede the military action with political action? If so, on what, uh, timing? I would think the answer's almost certainly, yes. And I wouldn't, I would think particularly of the contacts with Khrushchev. And I would think that if these are to be done, they must be scheduled in terms of time very, very carefully in relation to a potential military action. There must be a very, very precise series of, of contacts with him, and indications of what we'll do at certain times following that. And, thirdly, we should be prepared to answer your questions regarding the, the effect of these strikes and the time required to carry them off. I think . . .

JFK: How long would it take to get 'em organized.

McNamara: E-, e-, exactly. We'll be prepared . . .

JFK: In other words, how many days from tomorrow morning would it . . . . How many mornings from tomorrow morning would it take to get the, to take out just these missile [sites] . . .

[Here follow the last 6 pages, which include a discussion of who should be informed and when the next meeting should take place.]

Document #5 - October 16 Morning ExComm Meeting [audio file]:

http://www.jfklibrary.org/cmc_meeting_transcript_oct16_1150am.html

Document #6 - document #21 from FRUS, volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath: a transcript of the October 16 evening ExComm meeting: (I can provide a hard copy, if necessary)

http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/frusXI/01_25.html

Document #7 - "Real Player" audio file of October 16 evening ExComm meeting:

http://www.jfklibrary.org/cmc_meeting_transcript_oct16_pm.html

Document #8 - document #30 from FRUS, volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath: a summary of an October 18, 1962 Central Intelligence Agency evaluation of the Soviet missile threat in Cuba:

http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/frusXI/26_50.html

30. Editorial Note

On October 18, 1962, the Central Intelligence Agency released a "Joint Evaluation of the Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba," based on intelligence obtained as of 9 p.m. that day. The evaluation, prepared by the Guided Missile and Astronautics Committee, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and the National Photographic Interpretation Center, was codenamed Iron Bark because it drew upon intelligence material provided by the Central Intelligence Agency's important Soviet source, Col. Oleg Penkovsky. It was based on "relatively complete photo interpretation of U-2 photography" made on missions of October 14, and two on October 15 and "very preliminary and incomplete readout" of coverage of six U-2 missions on October 17.

The evaluation concluded that there was "at least one Soviet regiment consisting of eight launchers and sixteen 1020-nm (SS-4) medium-range ballistic missiles now deployed in western Cuba at two launch sites." These mobile missiles had to be considered operational and could be launched within 18 hours after the decision to launch was made. The evaluation concluded that "Fixed, soft sites, which could achieve initial operational capacity during December 1962, are now being deployed near Havana." These sites were probably intended for 2200-nm (SS-5) intermediate-range ballistic missiles and could be operational by December 1962. All missiles were manned by Soviet personnel and were under Soviet control. Although there was no positive evidence of nuclear warheads in Cuba, the evaluation suggested that "one must assume that nuclear warheads could now be available in Cuba to support the offensive missile capacity as it becomes operational." The expected warheads for these missiles would weigh 3,000 pounds and have yield in the low megaton range.

The significance of these developments, according to the evaluation, was that the Soviet Union "intends to develop Cuba into a prime strategic base, rather than as a token show of force. The mixed force of 1020- and 2200-nm missiles posed a common threat to the United States and a large portion of Latin America. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Cuba, 5 Sept-19 Oct 1962) See the Supplement. An extract of this evaluation is reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pages 187-191.

The Quarantine

Document #8 - document #34 from FRUS, vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis: Minutes of the Crucial October 20 ExComm Meeting, during which President Kennedy chose the blockade:

http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/frusXI/26_50.html

34. Minutes of the 505th Meeting of the National Security Council

Washington, October 20, 1962, 2:30-5:10 p.m.

//Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The meeting was held in the Oval Room. For the Attorney General's account of this meeting, see Thirteen Days, pp. 48-50.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
Attorney General
Robert F. Kennedy

CIA
John A. McCone, Director
Mr. Ray Cline
Mr. Arthur Lundahl
Mr. Chamberlain

Defense
Robert S. McNamara, Secretary
Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary
Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary (ISA)

JCS
General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA, Chairman

OEP
Edward A. McDermott, Director

State
Dean Rusk, Secretary
George Ball, Under Secretary
U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Adlai Stevenson, U.S. Ambassador to the UN
Edwin Martin, Assistant Secretary, Inter-American Affairs
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large

Treasury
Douglas Dillon, Secretary

White House
McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Theodore Sorensen, Special Counsel
Kenneth O'Donnell, Special Assistant to the President
Bromley Smith, Executive Secretary, National Security Council

Intelligence Briefing

The first twenty minutes were spent in the presentation and discussion of photographic intelligence establishing the presence in Cuba of Soviet intermediate-range and medium-range missiles, mobile missile launchers and missile sites.

Mr. Ray Cline of the Central Intelligence Agency summarized the report of the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and the National Photographic Interpretation Center, dated October 19, 1962 (SC 09538-62)./1/ Mr. Arthur Lundahl of CIA described the various missile sites and launching pads, displaying enlarged pictures identical to those in the Committee report.

/1/Apparent reference to the report of 8 p.m., October 19; see Document 33.

In response to the President's question, Mr. Cline stated that there were no U-2 photographic reconnaissance missions over Cuba from August 29th to October 14th. The gap in photographic coverage was in part due to bad weather and in part to a desire to avoid activating the SAM Air Defense installations which the Russians were hurriedly installing in Cuba during this period. Since October 14th, nine high altitude missions have been flown. Information from these missions is not fully processed, but will be available for presentation by Monday.

In summary, the Council was informed that sixteen SS-4 missiles, with a range of 1020 nautical miles were now operational in Cuba and could be fired approximately eighteen hours after a decision to fire was taken. The bearing of these launchers was 315 degrees, i.e. toward the central area of the United States.

The President summarized the discussion of the intelligence material as follows. There is something to destroy in Cuba now and, if it is destroyed, a strategic missile capability would be difficult to restore. (Specific details of the briefing are contained in the attached Committee report.)/2/

/2/Not found attached.

Blockage Track

Secretary McNamara explained to the President that there were differences among his advisers which had resulted in the drafting of alternative courses of action. He added that the military planners are at work on measures to carry out all recommended courses of action in order that, following a Presidential decision, fast action could be taken.

Secretary McNamara described his view as the "blockade route." This route is aimed at preventing any addition to the strategic missiles already deployed to Cuba and eventually to eliminate these missiles. He said to do this we should institute a blockade of Cuba and be prepared to take armed action in specified instances.

(The President was handed a copy of Ted Sorensen's "blockade route" draft of a Presidential message, which he read.)/3/

/3/Not found; however, drafts of three unattributed papers for blockade scenarios, all dated October 20, are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSC Meetings. One presented a 5-day scenario with anticipated Soviet, allied, and Cuban reaction; the second outlined nine courses of action in the 24 hours before a blockade was instituted; and the third, with "Third Draft" typed on it, offered 23 steps that had to be taken before the A hour. None of these papers, however, contained a draft Presidential message.

Secretary McNamara concluded by explaining that following the blockade, the United States would negotiate for the removal of the strategic missiles from Cuba. He said we would have to be prepared to accept the withdrawal of United States strategic missiles from Turkey and Italy and possibly agreement to limit our use of Guantanamo to a specified limited time. He added that we could obtain the removal of the missiles from Cuba only if we were prepared to offer something in return during negotiations. He opposed as too risky the suggestion that we should issue an ultimatum to the effect that we would order an air attack on Cuba if the missiles were not removed. He said he was prepared to tell Khrushchev we consider the missiles in Cuba as Soviet missiles and that if they were used against us, we would retaliate by launching missiles against the USSR.

Secretary McNamara pointed out that SNIE 11-19-62, dated October 20, 1962,/4/ estimates that the Russians will not use force to push their ships through our blockade. He cited Ambassador Bohlen's view that the USSR would not take military action, but would limit its reaction to political measures in the United Nations.

/4/See footnote 3, Document 32.

Secretary McNamara listed the disadvantages of the blockade route as follows:

1. It would take a long time to achieve the objective of eliminating strategic missiles from Cuba.
2. It would result in serious political trouble in the United States.
3. The world position of the United States might appear to be weakening.

The advantages which Secretary McNamara cited are:

1. It would cause us the least trouble with our allies.
2. It avoids any surprise air attack on Cuba, which is contrary to our tradition.
3. It is the only military course of action compatible with our position as a leader of the free world.
4. It avoids a sudden military move which might provoke a response from the USSR which could result in escalating actions leading to general war.

The President pointed out that during a blockade, more missiles would become operational, and upon the completion of sites and launching pads, the threat would increase. He asked General Taylor how many missiles we could destroy by air action on Monday.

General Taylor reported that the Joint Chiefs of Staff favor an air strike on Tuesday when United States forces could be in a state of readiness. He said he did not share Secretary McNamara's fear that if we used nuclear weapons in Cuba, nuclear weapons would be used against us.

Secretary Rusk asked General Taylor whether we dared to attack operational strategic missile sites in Cuba.

General Taylor responded that the risk of these missiles being used against us was less than if we permitted the missiles to remain there.

The President pointed out that on the basis of the intelligence estimate there would be some fifty strategic missiles operational in mid-December, if we went the blockade route and took no action to destroy the sites being developed.

General Taylor said that the principal argument he wished to make was that now was the time to act because this would be the last chance we would have to destroy these missiles. If we did not act now, the missiles would be camouflaged in such a way as to make it impossible for us to find them. Therefore, if they were not destroyed, we would have to live with them with all the consequent problems for the defense of the United States.

The President agreed that the missile threat became worse each day, adding that we might wish, looking back, that we had done earlier what we are now preparing to do.

Secretary Rusk said that a blockade would seriously affect the Cuban missile capability in that the Soviets would be unable to deploy to Cuba any missiles in addition to those now there.

Under Secretary Ball said that if an effective blockade was established, it was possible that our photographic intelligence would reveal that there were no nuclear warheads in Cuba; hence, none of the missiles now there could be made operational.

General Taylor indicated his doubt that it would be possible to prevent the Russians from deploying warheads to Cuba by means of a blockade because of the great difficulty of setting up an effective air blockade.

Secretary McNamara stated that if we knew that a plane was flying nuclear warheads to Cuba, we should immediately shoot it down. Parenthetically, he pointed out there are now 6000 to 8000 Soviet personnel in Cuba.

The President asked whether the institution of a blockade would appear to the free world as a strong response to the Soviet action. He is particularly concerned about whether the Latin American countries would think that the blockade was an appropriate response to the Soviet challenge.

The Attorney General returned to the point made by General Taylor, i.e. that now is the last chance we will have to destroy Castro and the Soviet missiles deployed in Cuba.

Mr. Sorensen said he did not agree with the Attorney General or with General Taylor that this was our last chance. He said a missile buildup would end if, as everyone seemed to agree, the Russians would not use force to penetrate the United States blockade.

Air Strike Route

Mr. Bundy handed to the President the "air strike alternative,"/5/ which the President read. It was also referred to as the Bundy plan.

/5/A copy of this 3-page scenario, which had paragraphs on the military program, schedule of public statements, notice to Khrushchev and Castro--Alternative 1, notice to Khrushchev and Castro--Alternative 2, and notice to Friends, is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Nitze Files: Black Book Cuba, and in the Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files, Cuba./5/

The Attorney General told the President that this plan was supported by Mr. Bundy, General Taylor, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with minor variations, by Secretary Dillon and Director McCone.

General Taylor emphasized the opportunity available now to take out not only all the missiles, but all the Soviet medium bombers (IL-28) which were neatly lined up in the open on airbases in Cuba.

Mr. McNamara cautioned that an air strike would not destroy all the missiles and launchers in Cuba, and, at best, we could knock out two-thirds of these missiles. Those missiles not destroyed could be fired from mobile launchers not destroyed. General Taylor said he was unable to explain why the IL-28 medium bombers had been left completely exposed on two airfields. The only way to explain this, he concluded, was on the ground that the Cubans and the Russians did not anticipate United States air strike.

Secretary Rusk said he hesitated to ask the question but he wondered whether these planes were decoys. He also wondered whether the Russians were trying to entice us into a trap. Secretary McNamara stated his strong doubt that these planes were decoys. Director McCone added that the Russians would not have sent one hundred shiploads of equipment to Cuba solely to play a "trick". General Taylor returned to the point he had made earlier, namely, that if we do not destroy the missiles and the bombers, we will have to change our entire military way of dealing with external threats.

The President raised the question of advance warning prior to military action--whether we should give a minimum of two hours notice of an air strike to permit Soviet personnel to leave the area to be attacked.

General Taylor said that the military would be prepared to live with a twenty-four hour advance notice or grace period if such advance notice was worthwhile politically. The President expressed his doubt that any notice beyond seven hours had any political value.

There was a brief discussion of the usefulness of sending a draft message to Castro, and a copy of such message was circulated./6/

/6/Not found.

The President stated flatly that the Soviet planes in Cuba did not concern him particularly. He said we must be prepared to live with the Soviet threat as represented by Soviet bombers. However, the existence of strategic missiles in Cuba had an entirely different impact throughout Latin America. In his view the existence of fifty planes in Cuba did not affect the balance of power, but the missiles already in Cuba were an entirely different matter.

The Attorney General said that in his opinion a combination of the blockade route and the air strike route was very attractive to him. He felt we should first institute the blockade. In the event that the Soviets continued to build up the missile capability in Cuba, then we should inform the Russians that we would destroy the missiles, the launchers, and the missile sites. He said he favored a short wait during which time the Russians could react to the blockade. If the Russians did not halt the development of the missile capability, then we would proceed to make an air strike. The advantage of proceeding in this way, he added, was that we would get away from the Pearl Harbor surprise attack aspect of the air strike route.

Mr. Bundy pointed out that there was a risk that we would act in such a way as to get Khrushchev to commit himself fully to the support of Castro.

Secretary Rusk doubted that a delay of twenty-four hours in initiating an air strike was of any value. He said he now favored proceeding on the blockade track.

Secretary Dillon mentioned seventy-two hours as the time between instituting the blockade and initiating an air strike in the event we receive no response to our initial action.

Director McCone stated his opposition to an air strike, but admitted that in his view a blockade was not enough. He argued that we should institute the blockade and tell the Russians that if the missiles were not dismantled within seventy-two hours, the United States would destroy the missiles by air attack. He called attention to the risk involved in a long drawn-out period during which the Cubans could, at will, launch the missiles against the United States. Secretary Dillon said that the existence of strategic missiles in Cuba was, in his opinion, not negotiable. He believed that any effort to negotiate the removal of the missiles would involve a price so high that the United States could not accept it. If the missiles are not removed or eliminated, he continued, the United States will lose all of its friends in Latin America, who will become convinced that our fear is such that we cannot act. He admitted that the limited use of force involved in a blockade would make the military task much harder and would involve the great danger of the launching of these missiles by the Cubans.

Deputy Secretary Gilpatric saw the choice as involving the use of limited force or of unlimited force. He was prepared to face the prospect of an air strike against Cuba later, but he opposed the initial use of all-out military force such as a surprise air attack. He defined a blockade as being the application of the limited use of force and doubted that such limited use could be combined with an air strike.

General Taylor argued that a blockade would not solve our problem or end the Cuban missile threat. He said that eventually we would have to use military force and, if we waited, the use of military force would be much more costly.

Secretary McNamara noted that the air strike planned by the Joint Chiefs involved 800 sorties. Such a strike would result in several thousand Russians being killed, chaos in Cuba, and efforts to overthrow the Castro government. In his view the probability was high that an air strike would lead inevitably to an invasion. He doubted that the Soviets would take an air strike on Cuba without resorting to a very major response. In such an event, the United States would lose control of the situation which could escalate to general war.

The President agreed that a United States air strike would lead to a major Soviet response, such as blockading Berlin. He agreed that at an appropriate time we would have to acknowledge that we were willing to take strategic missiles out of Turkey and Italy if this issue was raised by the Russians. He felt that implementation of a blockade would also result in Soviet reprisals, possibly the blockade of Berlin. If we instituted a blockade on Sunday, then by Monday or Tuesday we would know whether the missile development had ceased or whether it was continuing. Thus, we would be in a better position to know what move to make next.

Secretary Dillon called attention to the fact that even if the Russians agreed to dismantle the missiles now in Cuba, continuing inspection would be required to ensure that the missiles were not again made ready.

The President said that if it was decided to go the Bundy route, he would favor an air strike which would destroy only missiles. He repeated this view that we would have to live with the threat arising out of the stationing in Cuba of Soviet bombers.

Secretary Rusk referred to an air strike as chapter two. He did not think we should initiate such a strike because of the risk of escalating actions leading to general war. He doubted that we should act without consultation of our allies. He said a sudden air strike had no support in the law or morality, and, therefore, must be ruled out. Reading from notes, he urged that we start the blockade and only go on to an air attack when we knew the reaction of the Russians and of our allies.

At this point Director McCone acknowledged that we did not know positively that nuclear warheads for the missiles deployed had actually arrived in Cuba. Although we had evidence of the construction of storage places for nuclear weapons, such weapons may not yet have been sent to Cuba.

The President asked what we would say to those whose reaction to our instituting a blockade now would be to ask why we had not blockaded last July.

Both Mr. Sorensen and Mr. Ball made the point that we did not institute a blockade in July because we did not then know of the existence of the strategic missiles in Cuba.

Secretary Rusk suggested that our objective was an immediate freeze of the strategic missile capability in Cuba to be inspected by United Nations observation teams stationed at the missile sites. He referred to our bases in Turkey, Spain and Greece as being involved in any negotiation covering foreign bases. He said a United Nations group might be sent to Cuba to reassure those who might fear that the United States was planning an invasion.

Ambassador Stevenson stated his flat opposition to a surprise air strike, which he felt would ultimately lead to a United States invasion of Cuba. He supported the institution of the blockade and predicted that such action would reduce the chance of Soviet retaliation of a nature which would inevitably escalate. In his view our aim is to end the existing missile threat in Cuba without casualties and without escalation. He urged that we offer the Russians a settlement involving the withdrawal of our missiles from Turkey and our evacuation of Guantanamo base.

The President sharply rejected the thought of surrendering our base at Guantanamo in the present situation. He felt that such action would convey to the world that we had been frightened into abandoning our position. He was not opposed to discussing withdrawal of our missiles from Turkey and Greece, but he was firm in saying we should only make such a proposal in the future.

The Attorney General thought we should convey our firm intentions to the Russians clearly and suggested that we might tell the Russians that we were turning over nuclear weapons and missiles to the West Germans.

Ambassador Thompson stated his view that our first action should be the institution of a blockade. Following this, he thought we should launch an air strike to destroy the missiles and sites, after giving sufficient warning so that Russian nationals could leave the area to be attacked.

The President said he was ready to go ahead with the blockade and to take actions necessary to put us in a position to undertake an air strike on the missiles and missile sites by Monday or Tuesday.

General Taylor summarized the military actions already under way, including the quiet reinforcement of Guantanamo by infiltrating marines and the positioning of ships to take out United States depend-ents from Guantanamo on extremely short notice.

The Attorney General said we could implement a blockade very quickly and prepare for an air strike to be launched later if we so decided.

The President said he was prepared to authorize the military to take those preparatory actions which they would have to take in anticipation of the military invasion of Cuba. He suggested that we inform the Turks and the Italians that they should not fire the strategic missiles they have even if attacked. The warheads for missiles in Turkey and Italy could be dismantled. He agreed that we should move to institute a blockade as quickly as we possibly can.

In response to a question about further photographic surveillance of Cuba, Secretary McNamara recommended, and the President agreed, that no low level photographic reconnaissance should be undertaken now because we have decided to institute a blockade.

Secretary Rusk recommended that a blockade not be instituted before Monday in order to provide time required to consult our allies.

Mr. Bundy said the pressure from the press was becoming intense and suggested that one way of dealing with it was to announce shortly that we had obtained photographic evidence of the existence of strategic missiles in Cuba. This announcement would hold the press until the President made his television speech.

The President acknowledged that the domestic political heat following his television appearance would be terrific. He said he had opposed an invasion of Cuba but that now we were confronted with the possibility that by December there would be fifty strategic missiles deployed there. In explanation as to why we have not acted sooner to deal with the threat from Cuba, he pointed out that only now do we have the kind of evidence which we can make available to our allies in order to convince them of the necessity of acting. Only now do we have a way of avoiding a split with our allies.

It is possible that we may have to make an early strike with or without warning next week. He stressed again the difference between the conventional military buildup in Cuba and the psychological impact throughout the world of the Russian deployment of strategic missiles to Cuba. General Taylor repeated his recommendation that any air strike in Cuba included attacks on the MIGs and medium bombers.

The President repeated his view that our world position would be much better if we attack only the missiles. He directed that air strike plans include only missiles and missile sites, preparations to be ready three days from now.

Under Secretary Ball expressed his view that a blockade should include all shipments of POL to Cuba. Secretary Rusk thought that POL should not now be included because such a decision would break down the distinction which we want to make between elimination of strategic missiles and the downfall of the Castro government. Secretary Rusk repeated his view that our objective is to destroy the offensive capability of the missiles in Cuba, not, at this time, seeking to overthrow Castro!

The President acknowledged that the issue was whether POL should be included from the beginning or added at a later time. He preferred to delay possibly as long as a week.

Secretary Rusk called attention to the problem involved in referring to our action as a blockade. He preferred the use of the word "quarantine".

Parenthetically, the President asked Secretary Rusk to reconsider present policy of refusing to give nuclear weapons assistance to France. He expressed the view that in light of present circumstances a refusal to help the French was not worthwhile. He thought that in the days ahead we might be able to gain the needed support of France if we stopped refusing to help them with their nuclear weapons project.

There followed a discussion of several sentences in the "blockade route" draft of the President's speech. It was agreed that the President should define our objective in terms of halting "offensive missile preparations in Cuba". Reference to economic pressures on Cuba would not be made in this context.

The President made clear that in the United Nations we should emphasize the subterranean nature of the missile buildup in Cuba. Only if we were asked would we respond that we were prepared to talk about the withdrawal of missiles from Italy and Turkey. In such an eventuality, the President pointed out that we would have to make clear to the Italians and the Turks that withdrawing strategic missiles was not a retreat and that we would be prepared to replace these missiles by providing a more effective deterrent, such as the assignment of Polaris submarines. The President asked Mr. Nitze to study the problems arising out of the withdrawal of missiles from Italy and Turkey, with particular reference to complications which would arise in NATO. The President made clear that our emphasis should be on the missile threat from Cuba.

Ambassador Stevenson reiterated his belief that we must be more forthcoming about giving up our missile bases in Turkey and Italy. He stated again his belief that the present situation required that we offer to give up such bases in order to induce the Russians to remove the strategic missiles from Cuba.

Mr. Nitze flatly opposed making any such offer, but said he would not object to discussing this question in the event that negotiations developed from our institution of a blockade.

The President concluded the meeting by stating that we should be ready to meet criticism of our deployment of missiles abroad but we should not initiate negotiations with a base withdrawal proposal./7/

/7/The NSC Record of Action No. 2457 for this meeting reads:

"Soviet Strategic Missiles in Cuba

"a. Noted a briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence, supported by photographic intelligence, establishing the presence in Cuba of Soviet strategic missiles, including mobile launchers and missile sites under construction.

"b. Discussed alternative courses of action aimed at removing the strategic missiles from Cuba." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings)

Document #10 - "Real Player" audio File of President Kennedy's October 22, 1962 nationally televised address:

http://www.jfklibrary.org/j102262.htm

Document #11 - Front page from the October 23, 1962 edition of the Washington Post:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/digitalarchive/

The Crisis Averted

Document #12 - document #58 from FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath--a telephone conversation of October 24, 1962, during which Bundy informed Under Secretary of State George Ball that Soviet ships had "turned back" from the quarantine line.

http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/frusXI/51_75.html

58. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, October 24, 1962, 3:25 p.m.

//Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons--Cuba. No classification marking appears on the source text.

Bundy--Have you got the word in on what is happening at sea?

Ball--No.

Bundy--The six most interesting ships have turned back. Two others are turning on. We are starting over here a thinking session as to what might be done which will be going on all afternoon. If you want to come, it would be helpful to have you. Walt is here. If there is anyone you want to send, send him. I have told the Secretary and you are the only two I have told. Will you alert anyone else you wish to alert?

Ball--I will. The other ships are going forward?

Bundy--Two tankers are coming on, but six interesting ships have turned back; six may not be a precise figure. Khrushchev told Lord Russell he thought it would be useful to have a top level meeting.

Ball--I'll be over.

Document #13 - document #96 from FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath--a memorandum in which Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy informed Secretary of State Dean Rusk about his meeting with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on October 27, 1962.

http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/frusXI/76_100.html

96. Memorandum From Attorney General Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk

Washington, October 30, 1962.

//Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Cuba Missile Crisis, Khrushchev Correspondence. Top Secret. Drafted by Kennedy. For McGeorge Bundy's recollections of the meeting with the President during the late afternoon of October 27, at which the decision was taken to send Robert Kennedy to talk with Dobrynin, see Danger and Survival, pp. 432-434.

At the request of Secretary Rusk, I telephoned Ambassador Dobrynin at approximately 7:15 p.m. on Saturday, October 27th. I asked him if he would come to the Justice Department at a quarter of eight.

We met in my office. I told him first that we understood that the work was continuing on the Soviet missile bases in Cuba. Further, I explained to him that in the last two hours we had found that our planes flying over Cuba had been fired upon and that one of our U-2's had been shot down and the pilot killed. I said these men were flying unarmed planes.

I told him that this was an extremely serious turn in events. We would have to make certain decisions within the next 12 or possibly 24 hours. There was a very little time left. If the Cubans were shooting at our planes, then we were going to shoot back. This could not help but bring on further incidents and that he had better understand the full implications of this matter.

He raised the point that the argument the Cubans were making was that we were violating Cuban air space. I replied that if we had not been violating Cuban air space then we would still be believing what he and Khrushchev had said--that there were no long-range missiles in Cuba. In any case I said that this matter was far more serious than the air space over Cuba and involved peoples all over the world.

I said that he had better understand the situation and he had better communicate that understanding to Mr. Khrushchev. Mr. Khrushchev and he had misled us. The Soviet Union had secretly established missile bases in Cuba while at the same time proclaiming, privately and publicly, that this would never be done. I said those missile bases had to go and they had to go right away. We had to have a commitment by at least tomorrow that those bases would be removed. This was not an ultimatum, I said, but just a statement of fact. He should understand that if they did not remove those bases then we would remove them. His country might take retaliatory action but he should understand that before this was over, while there might be dead Americans there would also be dead Russians.

He asked me then what offer we were making. I said a letter had just been transmitted to the Soviet Embassy which stated in substance that the missile bases should be dismantled and all offensive weapons should be removed from Cuba./1/ In return, if Cuba and Castro and the Communists ended their subversive activities in other Central and Latin American countries, we would agree to keep peace in the Caribbean and not permit an invasion from American soil.

He then asked me about Khrushchev's other proposal dealing with the removal of the missiles from Turkey. I replied that there could be no quid pro quo--no deal of this kind could be made. This was a matter that had to be considered by NATO and that it was up to NATO to make the decision. I said it was completely impossible for NATO to take such a step under the present threatening position of the Soviet Union./2/

/1/See Document 95.

/2/The following typed sentence at the end of this paragraph was crossed out: "If some time elapsed--and per your instructions, I mentioned four or five months--I said I was sure that these matters could be resolved satisfactory."

Per your instructions I repeated that there could be no deal of any kind and that any steps toward easing tensions in other parts of the world largely depended on the Soviet Union and Mr. Khrushchev taking action in Cuba and taking it immediately.

I repeated to him that this matter could not wait and that he had better contact Mr. Khrushchev and have a commitment from him by the next day to withdraw the missile bases under United Nations supervision for otherwise, I said, there would be drastic consequences.

Document #14 - hardcopy of surveillance photograph

Caption: U.S. intelligence indicated that the Soviets were indeed removing the "missiles of October" from Cuba. This low-level photograph, taken on November 2, 1962, showed missile components being loaded onto Soviet ships for return to the USSR. Some of the vehicles on the docks were later identified as vans carrying nuclear warheads.