Related Documents

Documents to Accompany Vietnam Learning Package

Document #1) - Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1964-1968, vol. II, Vietnam: January-June 1965, document #84: see http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_ii/81_86.html

84. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/

En route from Saigon to Washington, February 7, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, McGeorge Bundy--Saigon, Vol. II. top Secret. Bundy met with the President from 10:48 to 11:25 p.m. on February 7. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) At a press briefing at the White House the following day, Press Secretary George Reedy said that Bundy had met with the President about 11 p.m. the previous evening, but "there were no substantive conversations, he merely left with the President a few written notes, a few papers for night reading." (Ibid., National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, McGeorge Bundy--Saigon, Vol. II) This memorandum and annex were presumably among the papers left with the President.

RE
The Situation in Vietnam

This memorandum attempts to describe the situation, the stakes and the measures which I think should now be taken.

I. Summary Conclusions

The situation in Vietnam is deteriorating, and without new U.S. action defeat appears inevitable--probably not in a matter of weeks or perhaps even months, but within the next year or so. There is still time to turn it around, but not much.

The stakes in Vietnam are extremely high. The American investment is very large, and American responsibility is a fact of life which is palpable in the atmosphere of Asia, and even elsewhere. The international prestige of the United States, and a substantial part of our influence, are directly at risk in Vietnam. There is no way of unloading the burden on the Vietnamese themselves, and there is no way of negotiating ourselves out of Vietnam which offers any serious promise at present. It is possible that at some future time a neutral non-Communist force may emerge, perhaps under Buddhist leadership, but no such force currently exists, and any negotiated U.S. withdrawal today would mean surrender on the installment plan.

The policy of graduated and continuing reprisal outlined in Annex A is the most promising course available, in my judgment. That judgment is shared by all who accompanied me from Washington, and I think by all members of the country team.

The events of the last twenty-four hours have produced a practicable point of departure for this policy of reprisal, and for the removal of U.S. dependents. They may also have catalyzed the formation of a new Vietnamese government. If so, the situation may be at a turning point.

There is much that can and should be done to support and to supplement our present effort, while adding sustained reprisals. But I want to stress one important general conclusion which again is shared by all members of my party: the U.S. mission is composed of outstanding men, and U.S. policy within Vietnam is mainly right and well directed. None of the special solutions or criticisms put forward with zeal by individual reformers in government or in the press is of major importance, and many of them are flatly wrong. No man is perfect, and not every tactical step of recent months has been perfectly chosen, but when you described the Americans in Vietnam as your first team, you were right.

II. The General Situation

For the last year--and perhaps for longer--the overall situation in Vietnam has been deteriorating. The Communists have been gaining and the anti-Communist forces have been losing. As a result there is now great uncertainty among Vietnamese as well as Americans as to whether Communist victory can be prevented. There is nervousness about the determination of the U.S. Government. There is recrimination and fear among Vietnamese political leaders. There is an appearance of wariness among some military leaders. There is a worrisome lassitude among the Vietnamese generally. There is a distressing absence of positive commitment to any serious social or political purpose. Outside observers are ready to write the patient off. All of this tends to bring latent anti-Americanism dangerously near to the surface.

To be an American in Saigon today is to have a gnawing feeling that time is against us. Junior officers in all services are able, zealous and effective within the limits of their means. Their morale is sustained by the fact that they know that they are doing their jobs well and that they will not have to accept the responsibility for defeat. But near the top, where responsibility is heavy and accountability real, one can sense the inner doubts of men whose outward behavior remains determined.

The situation is not all black. The overall military effectiveness of the Vietnamese armed forces in open combat continues to grow. The month of January was one of outstanding and genuine success in offensive military action, showing the highest gross count of Viet Cong dead of any month of the war, and a very high ratio also of enemy to friendly losses. We believe that General Westmoreland is right (and General Alsop wrong) when he says that the Viet Cong do not now plan to expose themselves to large-scale military engagements in which their losses on the average would be high and their gains low. (The operation at Binh Gia/2/ is analyzed as a special case, representing the taking of a friendly Catholic village as bait rather than a decision to force pitched battle--more such cases are expected and the particular military problem posed is difficult.)

/2/See footnote 5, Document 14.

Moreover, the Vietnamese people, although war weary, are also remarkably tough and resilient, and they do not find the prospect of Communist domination attractive. Their readiness to quit is much lower than the discouraging events of recent months might lead one to expect. It is probable that most Vietnamese think American withdrawal is more likely than an early switch to neutralism or surrender by major elements within Vietnam.

Nevertheless the social and political fabric is stretched thin, and extremely unpleasant surprises are increasingly possible--both political and military.

And it remains a stubborn fact that the percentage of the countryside which is dominated or threatened by the Viet Cong continues to grow. Even in areas which are "cleared," the follow-on pacification is stalled because of widespread belief that the Viet Cong are going to win in the long run. The areas which can be regarded as truly cleared and pacified and safe are few and shrinking. (An important exception to this is the area of Saigon and its immediate surroundings. The Hop Tac program of pacification in this area has not been an unqualified success, but it has not been a failure, and it has certainly prevented any strangling siege of Saigon. We did not have a chance to form an independent judgment on Hop Tac, but we did conclude that whatever its precise measure of success, it is of great importance that this operation be pursued with full vigor. That is the current policy of the mission.)

III. The Political Situation

Next only to the overall state of the struggle against the Viet Cong, the shape and structure of the government is the most important element of the Saigon situation. We made it our particular business to examine the question whether and to what degree a stable government is a necessity for the successful prosecution of our policy in Vietnam. We reached a mixed conclusion.

For immediate purposes--and especially for the initiation of reprisal policy, we believe that the government need be no stronger than it is today with General Khanh as the focus of raw power while a weak caretaker government goes through the motions. Such a government can execute military decisions and it can give formal political support to joint US/GVN policy. That is about all it can do.

In the longer run, it is necessary that a government be established which will in one way or another be able to maintain its political authority against all challenges over a longer time than the governments of the last year and a half.

The composition and direction of such a government is a most difficult problem, and we do not wholly agree with the mission in our estimate of its nature.

The mood of the mission with respect to the prospect of obtaining such a government is one of pessimism and frustration. This is only natural in terms of the events of the past many weeks. Two dominant themes predominate: a government headed by Khanh will be difficult if not impossible to deal with and, in any case, would be short lived; the Buddhists (or, more specifically, the few politically activist bonzes) must be confronted and faced down (by military means if necessary) lest they maintain their power to unseat any government that does not bow to their every demand. We tend to differ with the mission on both counts.

Specifically, we believe that General Khanh, with all his faults, is by long odds the outstanding military man currently in sight--and the most impressive personality generally. We do not share the conclusion of Ambassador Taylor that he must somehow be removed from the military and political scene.

There are strong reasons for the Ambassador's total lack of confidence in Khanh. At least twice Khanh has acted in ways that directly spoiled Ambassador Taylor's high hopes for December. When he abolished the High National Council he undercut the prospect of the stable government needed for Phase II action against the North. In January he overthrew Huong just when the latter, in the Embassy's view, was about to succeed in putting the bonzes in their place.

Khanh is not an easy man to deal with. It is clear that he takes a highly tactical view of truth, although General Westmoreland asserts that Khanh has never deceived him. He is intensely ambitious and intent above all else on maintaining and advancing his own power. He gravely lacks the confidence of many of his colleagues--military and civilian--and he seems not to be personally popular with the public. He is correctly assessed as tricky. He remains able, energetic, perceptive and resilient, and in our judgment he will pursue the fight against the Communists as long as he can count on U.S. help. (If he should conclude that the U.S. was violently against him personally, he might well seek a way to power by some anti-American path, a path which would lead to disaster for both Vietnam and the United States.)

But our principal reason for opposing any sharp break with Khanh is that we see no one else in sight with anything like his ability to combine military authority with some sense of politics.

We also differ from the Embassy in our estimate of the Buddhist leaders. The dominant Embassy view is that "the Buddhists" are really just a handful of irresponsible and designing clerics and that they must be curbed by firmness. We agree that they may well have to be limited at some point, especially in their use of mobs, but we also think they must be offered some accommodation.

We feel that the operative concept should be incorporation into the affairs of government rather than confrontation. This is easier said than done, because the Buddhists have many of the bad habits of men who have prospered by irresponsible opposition. Still there are signs that both Buddhist laymen and bonzes are now taking a more positive stance. We feel that the mission might do more in attempting to direct or channel the Buddhists into a more useful and positive role--an active rather than a passive approach. The Buddhists now play a key role in the balance of political forces, so that something more than "confrontation" must be achieved if there is to be any active government at all.

Having registered these two immediate and important differences of emphasis, we should add that in our judgment the mission has acted at about the right level of general involvement in the problem of Vietnamese government-making. American advice is sought by all elements, and all try to bend it to their own ends. The mission attempts to keep before all elements the importance of stable government, and it quietly presses the value of those who are known to be good, solid, able ministerial timber.

In a situation in which confidence is low and uncertainty great, strongly ambitious forces like Khanh and the Buddhists might react very vigorously against an overt American attempt to form or actively support a government against their liking. Anti-Americanism is a theme that is potentially explosive, and therefore tempting to those who feel that we are blocking their ambitions. This is one lesson, to us, of the outburst in Hue last month.

On the other hand, no power whose stake is as great and whose presence as clear as those of the United States in Vietnam can afford to stand aside entirely, and such a passive posture would not be understood or approved by the Vietnamese themselves.

It is important, therefore, that the mission maintain a constant and active concern with the politics of government-making. This it is doing. While it is very difficult to second-guess this effort, we do recommend a telegram of guidance which might take into account the marginal differences from mission thinking which are suggested above. In the light of further discussion, a message of this sort will be drafted for consideration.

IV. Strengthening the Pacification Program

If we suppose that new hopes are raised--at least temporarily--by a reprisal program, and if we suppose further that a government somewhat better than the bare minimum is established, the most urgent order of business will then be the improvement and broadening of the pacification program, especially in its non-military elements.

The mission fully concurs in the importance of this effort. We believe, however, that consideration should be given to important modifications in its organization for this purpose. In particular we believe that there should be intensive effort to strengthen our program at the margin between military advice and economic development--in the area which implies civil government for the soldiers and police action for the aid mission. These efforts, important as they are understood to be, are somehow at the edge of vision for both parties. General Westmoreland and his people inevitably think first of military programs, though they have been imaginative and understanding about the importance of other aspects. Mr. Killen and the USOM people are centrally concerned with problems of aid and of economic improvement, although they talk with conviction and energy about their increasing police effort. It remains a fact that its own organization for helping to provide real security for an area which has been "cleared" in crude military terms is unfinished business for the U.S. mission. What is true of our side is doubly true of the Vietnamese.

We do not offer a definite solution to this problem. We are inclined to suggest, however, that one important and unemployed asset is the Special Forces of the Defense Department. Because of the predominant role of the U.S. military, and because of the generous spirit and broad mind of General Westmoreland himself, we are inclined to believe that the easiest growing edge for this work may be through the use of some of these versatile and flexible units.

We would think it important, however, that an effort of this kind be coordinated at a high level between the Defense Department and AID, and we believe that a joint mission which would include either Director Bell or Mr. Gaud from AID is urgently needed for the purpose of building this missing link into our program.

V. A Sense of Positive Hope

Vietnamese talk is full of the need for "revolution." Vietnamese practice is empty of action to match the talk--so much so that the word "revolution" sometimes seems to have no real meaning. Yet in fact there is plainly a deep and strong yearning among the young and the unprivileged for a new and better social order. This is what the Buddhist leaders are groping toward; this is what the students and young Turk generals are seeking. This yearning does not find an adequate response in American policy as Vietnamese see it. This is one cause of latent anti-American feeling. We only perceived this problem toward the end of our visit. We think it needs urgent further attention. We make no present recommendations. We do believe that over the long pull our military and political firmness must be matched by our political and economic support for the hopes that are embodied to Vietnamese in the word "revolution."

VI. The Basic U.S. Commitment

The prospect in Vietnam is grim. The energy and persistence of the Viet Cong are astonishing. They can appear anywhere--and at almost any time. They have accepted extraordinary losses and they come back for more. They show skill in their sneak attacks and ferocity when cornered. Yet the weary country does not want them to win.

There are a host of things the Vietnamese need to do better and areas in which we need to help them. The place where we can help most is in the clarity and firmness of our own commitment to what is in fact as well as in rhetoric a common cause. There is one grave weakness in our posture in Vietnam which is within our own power to fix--and that is a widespread belief that we do not have the will and force and patience and determination to take the necessary action and stay the course.

This is the overriding reason for our present recommendation of a policy of sustained reprisal. Once such a policy is put in force, we shall be able to speak in Vietnam on many topics and in many ways, with growing force and effectiveness.

One final word. At its very best the struggle in Vietnam will be long. It seems to us important that this fundamental fact be made clear and our understanding of it be made clear to our own people and to the people of Vietnam. Too often in the past we have conveyed the impression that we expect an early solution when those who live with this war know that no early solution is possible. It is our own belief that the people of the United States have the necessary will to accept and to execute a policy that rests upon the reality that there is no short cut to success in South Vietnam.

McG. B.

Annex A/3/

/3/Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Also printed in Pentagon Papers: Gravel Edition, vol. III, pp. 687-691. Previous drafts of this paper dated February 6 and 7, both of which were entitled "A New Approach to Retaliation," are in the Johnson Library, National Security File, International Meetings and Travel File, McGeorge Bundy--Saigon, Vol. II.

Document #2 - Photograph of (from left to right) Secretary of State Dean Rusk, President Lyndon B. Johnson, and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara discussing Vietnam during a White House meeting held on January 20, 1967. National Archives and Records Administration. See:
http://arcweb.archives.gov/arc/arch_results_detail.jsp?&pg=27&si=0&st=b&rp=digital&nh=53

Document #3 - FRUS, 1964-1968, volume II, document #264.
See: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_ii/261_270.html

264. Diary Entry by the Ambassador to Vietnam (Taylor)/1/

Honolulu, April 20, 1965.

/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Diaries, T-272-69. Secret.

I left Saigon on Sunday, April 18, for Honolulu and returned to Saigon on Thursday, April 22. Purpose of the trip was to discuss with McNamara and party DOD 152339Z, copy attached./2/ The main business was done in two executive sessions on Tuesday, April 20. The following attended:

/2/Document 256.

McNamara
McNaughton
Wheeler
Sharp
William Bundy
Taylor
Westmoreland

We first considered the question of the introduction of additional U.S. and third country combat forces. There was no disagreement in estimating the situation. We all considered that since we could not hope to break the will of Hanoi by bombing alone, we must do better in the campaign against the Viet Cong in SVN.

While conceding that bombing would not do the trick alone, we also did not believe that any combination of pressures could end the situation quickly, certainly not within six months. All favored mounting pressure against the North but no one advocated attacking Hanoi. All believed that the present target system, extended to include northern targets out of MIG range, dikes and dams, electric power plants and restrikes on old targets would keep our aviation busy for an almost indefinite period. I stressed that repetition of the same level of attack was in itself a form of escalation.

With regard to the need for additional U.S. combat troops, in view of the inadequacy of ARVN units presently operational or to become operational in 1965, we agreed on a Phase I which would call for the introduction into SVN of nine U.S. battalions and four third country battalions between now and the end of summer.

With the present in-country strength of about 33,000, this reinforcement would bring the U.S. personnel to about 82,000, with something over 7,000 third country troops in addition. We recognized that it might be necessary to follow with a Phase II and III which would include a U.S. division, a ROK division minus and the remainder of the Marine Expeditionary Force. Final totals in that case would be 123,000 U.S. and about 22,000 third country combat forces.

We agreed to a new text of instructions for me as Ambassador conforming pretty generally to my previous recommendation.

We were generally opposed to the encadrement of U.S. soldiers in ARVN units and to the extensive use of USA civil affairs personnel in the provinces. We supported the concept of an international force, the extended use of mobile dispensaries and a three province test of a new U.S pacification organization.

Principal attitudes of interest were (a) desire by certain Chiefs of Staff for a dramatically heightened escalation of bombing (Wheeler disagreeing); (b) JCS emphasis on need to introduce troops for possible contingencies rather than for primary use in curbing the Viet Cong.

It was understood that McNamara would carry back our agreed recommendation and endeavor to secure authority without delay.

Document #4 - Photograph of General William Westmoreland meeting with President Johnson in the Oval Office in November 1967. National Archives and Records Administration.
See: http://arcweb.archives.gov/arc/arch_results_detail.jsp?&pg=24&si=0&st=b&rp=digital&nh=53

Document #5 - FRUS, 1964-1968, volume III, Vietnam: June-December 1965, document #17.
See: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_iii/010.html

17. Telegram From the Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (Westmoreland) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)/1/

Saigon, June 24, 1965, 8:20 p.m.

/1/Source: Center of Military History, Westmoreland Papers, COMUSMACV Message Files. Top Secret. Also sent to Admiral Sharp.

MAC 3240. Ref: A. JCS 2331-65 230144Z. B. MACJOO 070335Z./2/

/2/Reference A is Document 13. Reference B is telegram MACJOO 19118; see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. II, Document 337.

1. Per your request in reference I have following views. Some items are based on studies; others are not.
   
   
2. By way of introduction, the premise behind whatever further actions we may undertake, either in SVN or DRV, must be that we are in for the long pull. The struggle has become a war of attrition. Short of decision to introduce nuclear weapons against sources and channels of enemy power, I see no likelihood of achieving a quick, favorable end to the war. The fabric of GVN civil functions and services has been rendered so ineffective and listless by successive coups and changes, and the military arm is in such need of revitalization that we can come to no other conclusion. In this context the following is submitted for your consideration.
   
   
3. I am becoming more convinced every day that US forces in appropriate numbers must be deployed to permit the Vietnamese with our help to carry the war to the enemy. Objectives would be to neutralize enemy power, give heart to the war weary ARVN and provide adequate maneuverable fire power to attack the enemy formations wherever they can be found and fixed. With regard to your comment that some in Washington consider that more than a 10,000 man US combat force will invoke visions of the French, I can only comment that force of that number will not give us a chance of winning or assure avoidance of defeat. Although the hazard exists, there is absolutely no logical reason to conclude that we will be cast in the role of the French. It's up to the US leadership in SVN to insure that we do not fall into such a role, by means of indoctrination, discipline, morale, positioning the masses of US combat forces away from population centers and administrative controls, all of which we now stress. I am confident that this one is manageable.
4. As a refinement and supplement to the forces which may be required as set forth in paragraph 10B, Ref B, I believe the following will also be required, sooner or later.
5. A minimum of 7 more army helicopter companies than presently deployed or approved, and two more USMC helo squadrons in I Corps. Ratio is 2 companies (sqdns) per separate US brigade, 1 company per 3d country brigade.
   
   
6. The 101st Abn Div Brigade and 173d Abn Brigade retained in country and both positioned in Bien Hoa area under a task force HQ to provide the heavy mobile punch to gain the initiative.
   
   
7. Possibly at least another US infantry or airborne division to provide an offensive punch and get ARVN troops in the III Corps area on the offensive. VC order of battle in III Corps area, plus other mobile VC units nearby, are approaching the potential for sustained if not successful attack on communication centers.
8. The foregoing are big orders. However, believe it is time all concerned face up to fact that we must be prepared for a long war which will probably involve increasing numbers of US troops. If the Communists have the determination to make it such, they certainly have the capabilities and we have no choice but to match them, with an increment left over in our favor.
   
   
9. Actions which we may take against the DRV include several which I think will increase pressure on Hanoi and support our effort in SVN, but which do not involve unacceptable risk of provoking an escalation to the extent of ChiCom involvement.
10. Use B-52's on isolated military targets remote from civilian populations. Several ammo and supply depots fit this description. A study could turn up more. B-52's could put massive fire power on such area targets with much more effectiveness and less risk than the equivalent in fighter bombers.
    
    Interdict the trans Nanning-Hanoi-Kunming Railroad. There are 5 key bridges whose destruction would be devastating. 10 percent of total import tonnages use this railroad to Hanoi; but we suspect the tonnages have a much higher qualitative value.
    
    
11. Interdict Haiphong Harbor with repetitive mining.
    
    
12. Accelerate leaflet operations targeted on the DRV population centers.
    
    
13. Continue our air interdiction programs of LOC's. It takes a long time for cumulative results to produce a telling effect on primitive DRV LOC system. This is another aspect of the war of attrition which we must be prepared to prosecute in full measure despite mounting costs.
14. To conclude, I will emphasize some general thoughts which seem pertinent.

1. It is difficult, if not impossible for me to imagine how we can commit and sustain US forces, air, surface and naval, without backing them up for the long pull by mobilization of manpower, industrial and training resources at least to a limited degree. I face the very practical problem of maintaining morale of people on their second combat tours, with many, many more to come, I suspect, when all the forces we require are committed. I understand almost the entire complement of aviators in the 1st Cav will be on their 2d tour by the time it gets here, while the average US citizen enjoys his butter at no inconvenience.
   
   
2. It would seem that we should prepare US and world opinion for the rigors ahead by airing an objective, complete analysis of the problem we face and what we must do about it. The news couldn't be worse overall than it is now made out to be in piece-meal fashion by irresponsible or uninformed reporting and editorializing today. This could well be the most salutary thing we might do. The government would then be in a position to counterattack, in good faith, the distorted reporting of the crepe hangers.

Document #6 - FRUS, 1964-1968, volume III, document #16.
See: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_iii/010.html

16. Editorial Note

On June 23, 1965, President Johnson met in the White House at 5:50 p.m. with his senior advisers to discuss Vietnam. See Document 15 for a record of the discussion during the first part of the meeting. According to William Bundy's recollections, based on notes he took at the meeting, the discussion then turned to the question of the policy alternatives that would be open to the administration at the end of the summer. The general feeling, Bundy recorded, was that more forces would be needed. "Alexis Johnson, back from Saigon on consultation, was skeptical: 15 American battalions was a good level-off point, and we must accept that this would be a long war, without shortcuts and with only the grinding proof to the Viet Cong that they could not win. Ball at once chimed in, giving the gist of his argument that we should stop at 100,000 and then think hard--even about plans for cutting our losses and shifting our focus of action in Southeast Asia to Thailand. Rusk and McNamara objected to the last idea: Thailand, they thought, could not be held if SVN had given up. Rather, Rusk said, we would end up with the only secure areas Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and NATO, with even India falling to the Communist Chinese. It was an extreme statement, and my notes show an exclamation point in the margin--and a note to myself to get an estimate of the consequences of withdrawal from SVN.

"After this exchange, McNamara moved in the opposite direction from Ball. His proposal was a combination of a lot more force, in the South and possibly selectively in the North as well, and a much more intensive negotiating effort than he felt had yet been made. At least, he said, let us show the President what might be done on these two lines, coordinated with each other. He had the ideas on additional forces, and Ball had the ideas on moves toward a settlement; perhaps the two meshed with each other, and were less contradictory than some might suppose.

"The result was at least agreement on the next steps. The President, who had for the most part let the discussion rage around him without injecting his own views, directed McNamara and Ball, with one or two staff men each, to produce studies covering military and political moves over the next three months and beyond. These were to come back in a week, although there was of course no assurance that the issue would then be decided." (Johnson Library, Papers of William P. Bundy, Chapter 26, pages 22-23)

Document #7 - FRUS, 1964-1968, volume III, document #55.
See: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_iii/050.html

55. Notes of Meeting/1/

Washington, July 8, 1965.

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 150, Meeting of Foreign Affairs Consultants. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy on July 10.

VIETNAM PANEL/2/

/2/The Vietnam panel was a sub-panel of the President's Panel on Foreign Affairs, a senior advisory group of former military leaders and statesmen selected during the 1964 Presidential campaign. The group met for the first time, at the President's request, on July 8 at 11 a.m. in the Department of State to consider a variety of problems confronting the administration. The group was divided for discussion purposes into panels on Vietnam, Europe, and Latin America. The Vietnam panel consisted of General Omar N. Bradley, John J. McCloy, Roswell Gilpatric, Arthur Larson, and Dr. George Kistiakowsky. According to William Bundy, the idea of convening the advisory panel developed in early June, and the President approved the suggestion at the beginning of July. The group received extensive briefing materials on July 7, met in separate panels on the morning of July 8, and met again for a joint discussion after lunch. President Johnson met in the White House at 6:15 p.m. on July 8 with Dean Acheson, Arthur Dean, and Robert Lovett of the Europe panel; John Cowles of the Latin America panel; and General Bradley and McCloy of the Vietnam panel, and received the group's recommendations. (Johnson Library, Papers of William P. Bundy, Ch. 27, p. 15)

This group consisted of Messrs. Bradley, Gilpatric, Kistiakowsky, Larson, and McCloy. It met with Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Ambassador Thompson, and Mr. William Bundy. The following are highlights:

1. Stakes and Objectives in South Vietnam.

The group, with the possible exception of Mr. Larson, felt that the stakes were very high indeed. They concurred in the Administration judgment that Thailand could not be held if South Vietnam were taken over, and they thought that the effects in Japan and India could be most serious. They particularly felt that the effect in Europe might also be most serious, and that de Gaulle would find many takers for his argument that the US could not now be counted on to defend Europe.

They also felt that South Vietnam was a crucial test of the ability of the free world and of the US to counter the Communist tactic of "wars of national liberation," and that a US defeat would necessarily lead to worldwide questioning whether US commitments could be relied on.

It was the feeling of the group that these consequences would be accentuated if the US by its own decision withdrew from South Vietnam, of if the US suffered a military defeat there. On the other hand, the group felt that the consequences would not be much reduced if a Communist takeover took place as a result of a change in government in Saigon, as a result of which the US was asked to leave.

Mr. Larson appeared to dissent from this assessment, in line with his over-all view that we should be seeking UN action or serious negotiations (see para 4 below).

2. Increase of Combat Forces in South Vietnam

In line with their view of the grave stakes, the group generally felt that there should be no question of making whatever combat force increases were required. Several members of the group thought that our actions to date had perhaps been too restrained, and had been misconstrued by Hanoi that we were less than wholly determined.

The group urged that, in connection with any decisions for further increases, there should be a full spelling out of the military situation and the facts making the increases necessary.

One or two members of the group asked whether it was possible to undertake the closing of the South Vietnamese border as a military operation. They appeared, however, to accept Secretary McNamara's statement that this would be a very fast, major operation of uncertain effect, and that the job had to be done within South Vietnam, including the possibility of major forces in the plateau area--although this currently did not seem wise because of the fact that the main operation route (Route 19) was cut in several places and would have to be fully defended before forces could be sustained in the plateau other than by air supply.

3. The Policy on Bombing of the DRV

Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara, and Ambassador Thompson, laid out the various factors--particularly the question of Soviet reaction--that had led us not to hit Hanoi and Haiphong. The consultants appeared to accept these points, and none pressed for any early change in this policy. However, General Bradley did raise the question whether we might not conduct individual raids on Hanoi and Haiphong in reprisal for specific outrages in the South. It was noted that this should not be done for outrages confined to Americans--but noted equally that most outrages were not likely to be of this character.

4. Negotiating and International Actions

There was much discussion whether it would be useful to take the South Vietnam issue to the UN. Mr. Larson argued at length for this course, but much of his discussion related to whether it should have been done in 1961 before we went into the advisory build-up. At the present time, Mr. Larson said that his soundings indicated that there would be much support in the United Nations for a simple call for the convening of a Geneva Conference. Others doubted whether there would not be hookers such as a demand for the cessation of bombing. Mr. Larson himself did not see much use in convening the Geneva Conference, and appeared to have in mind that the UN itself might act to introduce forces or police a cease-fire. Others doubted very strongly that either of these was either practical or useful, and Mr. Acheson and Mr. Dean were vehement on the subject in the later plenary session. (Mr. Dean said that this was no time to "turn over our Far East policy to the UN.")

Mr. Larson's basic underlying view appeared to be grave doubt that we would get a truly viable and democratic Vietnam even by causing Hanoi to pull out, and he repeatedly queried whether what we might get as a "success" would be that much better than what we might get now. Dr. Kistiakowsky suggested that the real difficulty might be the difference between a South Vietnam in which individuals now in the Viet Cong were free to engage in political activity--which would certainly have its difficulties--and a South Vietnam in which the Communist Viet Cong had become a part of a coalition government and were highly likely to take over. The matter was not really developed in detail, but it was clear that the group thought we needed to look hard at just what we did expect to come out in South Vietnam--and equally clear that none of the other members of the group were prepared to buy Mr. Larson's basic thesis.

As to going to the UN, it should be noted that several members of the group, while clearly opposing Mr. Larson's line, thought that it might be useful at some time--perhaps in the context of increased military commitments--to do this, in order to make clear again that we were ready for negotiations. But the general feeling was that such a move at the present time would not be useful and would be a dangerous sign of weakness. (General Bradley particularly stressed this point.)

In the plenary session, Mr. Hoffman (who, like Mr. Larson, had apparently been having extensive personal contacts in the UN corridors) more or less backed Mr. Larson's thesis in favor of an early move in the UN. He thought it was essential to persuade the Afro-Asian countries we were not acting as imperialists, and that many of them did have this view. He specifically suggested a UN call for talks which would include the two Vietnams, the US/USSR/UK/France/Communist China, but also the Liberation Front. The plenary session did not pursue the question of dealing with the Liberation Front, but the matter had been raised in the Panel, and the Panel members appeared to accept Secretary Rusk's statement of the many strong reasons why this would be unwise and unproductive in terms of real negotiations, and seriously damaging to the whole view of the war on which our actions were based.

5. Prognosis of the Situation

Mr. McCloy spoke at some length--both in the Panel and in the later plenary session--on the degree to which he had been impressed during the discussion with the toughness of the situation. He thought that it was most unlikely that merely blunting the monsoon offensive would bring Hanoi to a negotiating mood, and that the situation would probably remain critical for a long time. He was particularly concerned that the Soviets might be brought increasingly to what he called an "annealing" of the Sino-Soviet relationship, i.e., the Soviets competing with the ChiComs and acting on parallel lines, although with no necessary resolution of the basic policy differences between them.

While others did not express themselves at length on this question, it seemed clear that Mr. McCloy's views had many takers both in the Panel and in the plenary session.

In the plenary session, Mr. Dean said that he thought there was a great deal of sentiment in the country for doing whatever it took, if we were going to go on at all. Mr. Lovett made the point that it was not useful to talk about "victory", that what was really involved was preventing the expansion of Communism by force; in a sense, avoiding defeat. This view seemed to be generally shared.

6. Specific Suggestions

The importance of local intelligence was particularly stressed by General Bradley, including the importance of Americans throughout the countryside.

Mr. McCloy and others stressed the great importance of the closest possible contact with our allies, and wondered if more could not be done particularly with the British, and, he thought, the Germans.

Mr. Larson thought that it would be useful for the government, particularly as it took further decisions, to spell out a number of points that had been bothering the public. He specifically mentioned the legal justification for bombing in the North.

Mr. Cowles thought that government sources had consistently painted too rosy a picture of the situation, and Mr. Lovett joined in this view.

Mr. Cowles thought that one highly popular move in South Vietnam might be for the government to abolish taxes, with the US making up the deficit through increased economic aid.

Document #8 - "Real One" Audio File of June 8, 1965 telephone conversation, during which President Johnson discussed Vietnam with Sen. Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.). Lyndon B. Johnson Library and Museum.
See: http://oak.lbjlib.utexas.edu/website/streaming-index.html

Document #9 - FRUS, 1964-1968, volume II, document #307.
See: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_ii/301_310.html

307. Letter From Clark M. Clifford to President Johnson/1/

Washington, May 17, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC History of the Deployment of Major U.S. Forces to Vietnam. No classification marking.

Dear Mr. President:

I am returning herewith the letter of the Director of Central Intelligence, dated May 8, 1965,/2/ together with enclosures.

/2/Document 286.

I which to make one major point.

I believe our ground forces in South Vietnam should be kept to a minimum, consistent with the protection of our installations and property in that country. My concern is that a substantial buildup of U.S. ground troops would be construed by the Communists, and by the world, as a determination on our part to win the war on the ground.

This could be a quagmire. It could turn into an open end commitment on our part that would take more and more ground troops, without a realistic hope of ultimate victory.

I do not think the situation is comparable to Korea. The political posture of the parties involved, and the physical conditions, including terrain, are entirely different.

I continue to believe that the constant probing of every avenue leading to a possible settlement will ultimately be fruitful. It won't be what we want, but we can learn to live with it.

Respectfully yours,

Clark

Document #10 - Photograph: Under Secretary of State George Ball and President Johnson discuss Vietnam during a White House meeting held in July 1966. From National Archives and Records Administration.
See: http://arcweb.archives.gov/arc/arch_results_detail.jsp?&pg=32&si=0&st=b&rp=digital&nh=53

Document #11 - FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. III, document #26.
See: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_iii/020.html

26. Paper by the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 48, Memos to the President on VN Feb. 1965-Apr. 1966. Top Secret. Sent to Rusk and to McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, McNaughton, and Unger under a June 28 covering memorandum from Ball, which explained that an expanded version of the paper would be circulated to the group prior to the meeting scheduled to discuss the paper on June 29. The text of the expanded paper is ibid. The text printed here, which was prepared in response to President Johnson's June 23 instruction, was drafted by Ball, with support from his staff, William Bundy, and several INR staff members. The final analysis and drafting was done by Ball. (Johnson Library, Papers of William P. Bundy, Ch. 26, p. 23)

William Bundy recalls that when Ball's paper was discussed in the Department of State on June 29 by the group to which it was circulated, it was the summary that was the focus of the discussion, and it was criticized as outlining "the worst way to lose if it came to that." The group felt that it was "absurd to insist on a new perfection just as the going was at its worst; to Asian eyes, it would have been the most cynical exit method possible." (Ibid., Ch. 27, p. 6) In light of this criticism, Ball modified his proposal in the paper he sent to the President on July 1; see Document 40.

CUTTING OUR LOSSES IN SOUTH VIET-NAM

Summary

This paper, written on the premise that we are losing the war in Viet-Nam, advances and supports the following propositions:

1. We cannot achieve our political objectives by expanding the bombing of North Viet-Nam. On the contrary, extending the geographical scope of our bombing will pose grave dangers of involving both Red China and the Soviet Union while isolating the United States from its friends and allies.
2. There is no assurance that we can achieve our objectives by substantially expanding American forces in South Viet-Nam and committing them to direct combat. On the contrary, we would run grave risks of bogging down an indeterminate number of American troops in a protracted and bloody conflict of uncertain outcome. This risk is so great, in fact, that those who advocate this course must sustain the burden of proof that commitment of American forces to combat will assure our objectives at an acceptable cost.
3. Combining expanded air attacks in the North with increased troop commitments in the South will not achieve the desired objective. The whole is not greater than the sum of its parts.
4. Since the measures discussed in paragraphs 1 and 2 above offer no assurance that we can win the war by substantially greater US commitments, we should undertake either to extricate ourselves or to reduce our defense perimeters in South Viet-Nam to accord with the capabilities of a limited US deployment.
5. This is our last clear chance to make this decision. If we go forward with Phase III combat, even at the present level of troop deployment, a substantial number of Americans will be killed. This will make it much harder and more costly to extricate ourselves or reduce our commitments. We should, therefore, revise current orders to return to Phase II and we should maintain our present levels of deployment while we seek to get out of the quagmire and cut our losses.
6. By pursuing a systematic and careful plan for cutting our losses we should be able to create the conditions under which we can get out of a dangerous situation without excessive loss of American prestige and influence.

How To Think About the Problem

To determine a proper course of action we must balance the risks and costs of a war fought by United States forces against the risks and costs of a carefully organized tactical withdrawal of the United States from South Viet-Nam or a systematic reduction of our territorial commitment to accord with the capabilities of a limited US deployment.

Obviously, if a curtailment of our commitment in South Viet-Nam would place the United States in imminent peril, we would be justified in taking long chances in pouring troops and equipment into that beleaguered country and in running large risks of escalation.

On the other hand, if we could accomplish such curtailment in a manner that would minimize the costs and dangers to the United States, the indicated formula would be quite different.

The ultimate decision, therefore, involves a hard-nosed judgment as to the relative costs and dangers to America--both short-term and long-term--of these two courses of action.

Plan for Cutting Our Losses

Against the background of these propositions, we propose a plan that should either create the conditions for a systematic US extrication or--less likely--establish a sound basis for our continued involvement at present levels of commitment.

This plan consists of the following elements:

Step 1

The President should make the firm decision that he will not commit United States land forces to combat in South Viet-Nam.

Step 2

We should use every occasion to re-emphasize what has been clear ever since the first Eisenhower letter/2/ but has not been recently stated--that our assistance is being provided on two explicit conditions:

/2/Sent to President Diem on October 1, 1954. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XIII, Part 2, pp. 2166-2167.

(a) that there is a government genuinely representing the people of South Viet-Nam which continues to ask for our support; and

(b) that such government maintains an adequate standard of performance, both in the conduct of the war and the making of necessary political, economic and social reforms.

Step 3

1. Since Americans are dying in South Viet-Nam, the United States has both the right and duty to demand of Saigon that it fashion a stable Government of National Union. We should, therefore, make the following demarche not only on General Ky but on the leaders of all principal groups in Saigon--the Catholics, the Buddhists, the Cao Dai, the military, the Dai Viet:

(a) unless, within a month's time, those leaders are able to put together a Government of National Union under civilian leadership, the United States will have to reconsider the extent of its commitment until such a Government is formed;

(b) a Government of National Union must have authentic representation of all key ethnic, religious, and regional groups with a commitment to national elections as soon as hostilities cease;

(c) such a Government must announce and begin to implement a broad program of political, social and economic reforms, including a cancellation of all peasant debts, land reform, seed and fertilizer programs, etc.

(d) the Government must announce the essentials of the Acheson Plan/3/--including a major amnesty effort--in order to attract and protect defectors from the Viet Cong so as to provide a sound intelligence base for our military operations and a transition to a post-hostility reconstruction of South Viet-Nam as a national entity.

/3/See vol. II, Document 287.

The ability of the Saigon Government to accomplish these objectives is not dependent on the course of the war. If there is to be genuine unity, it can come about regardless of whether the ARVN is winning or merely holding its own during the rainy season. In fact, the worse the war, the greater the crisis that should instill a willingness to abandon internecine strife and unite against the common enemy. If no such willingness prevails in Saigon, we cannot take over the war ourselves.

Step 4

If the leaders of the various factions in Saigon prove unwilling or unable to put aside petty factional jealousies and comply with the US demarche we must be prepared to follow through. We must be prepared to advise the Ky Government--or whatever government may then be in power--that we cannot maintain even the present level of our assistance.

It is more than likely that a notice of this kind from the United States Government would have the effect of either

(a) inducing the Ky Government to adopt an extreme nationalist position and announce it would go it alone without United States help; or

(b) bring about the fall of the Ky Government in favor of a government prepared to try to find a political solution with the Viet Cong.

In either event, we would not expect that American forces would leave quickly. Rather we would expect a protracted discussion between US representatives and representatives of the various Vietnamese factions.

Should Ky or his successor demand the immediate removal of US forces from South Viet-Nam, he would almost certainly be ousted by more moderate elements. Even if those elements were neutralist, they would still tend to regard our presence for a period of time as essential to prolonged bargaining with the Viet Cong and Hanoi. Our willingness to cooperate in this negotiating phase could permit us to remain in South Viet-Nam for a considerable period and thus avoid any public appearance of a precipitate and undignified withdrawal.

We could use this interval profitably to establish the justice and wisdom of our position with our friends and allies. We could also undertake the necessary diplomatic and economic actions in Thailand and Laos designed to offset so far as possible the immediate shock of the developments in South Viet-Nam.

Defensive and Affirmative Actions

In our anxiety to build up support for the struggle in South Viet-Nam, we have tended to exaggerate the consequences for US power and prestige of a tactical withdrawal from South Viet-Nam. Admittedly, such a withdrawal would create short-term problems, especially in Thailand, but by taking prompt and effective defensive and affirmative measures we should be able to avoid any serious long-term consequences. By and large, the world knows that the government in Saigon is a joke, and if our withdrawal resulted from an effort to face this problem squarely, friendly nations would not interpret it as a US failure to keep its commitments. More likely most nations would consider that we had more than kept our commitments to Viet-Nam--and that our decision to force the issue of stability was a mark of prudence and maturity.

The following memorandum/4/ contains a discussion of some of the measures which should be taken to avoid damage to our position in specific countries and areas.

/4/Presumably a reference to the expanded version of this paper cited in footnote 1 above.

Renvoi

The position taken in this memorandum does not suggest that the United States should abdicate leadership in the cold war. But any prudent military commander carefully selects the terrain on which to stand and fight, and no great captain has ever been blamed for a successful tactical withdrawal.

From our point of view, the terrain in South Viet-Nam could not be worse. Jungles and rice paddies are not designed for modern arms and, from a military point of view, this is clearly what General de Gaulle described to me as a "rotten country".

Politically, South Viet-Nam is a lost cause. The country is bled white from twenty years of war and the people are sick of it. The Viet Cong--as is shown by the Rand Corporation Motivation and Morale Study/5/--are deeply committed.

/5/See Document 27.

Hanoi has a Government and a purpose and a discipline. The "government" in Saigon is a travesty. In a very real sense, South Viet-Nam is a country with an army and no government.

In my view, a deep commitment of United States forces in a land war in South Viet-Nam would be a catastrophic error. If ever there was an occasion for a tactical withdrawal, this is it.

Document #12 - FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. III, document #40.
See: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_iii/040.html

40. Paper by the Under Secretary of State (Ball)/1/

Washington, undated.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Vol. XXXVII, Memos (C). Top Secret. Sent by Ball to McGeorge Bundy on July 1, with a covering note indicating that the paper was "for inclusion in your book for the President." Also printed in The Pentagon Papers: New York Times Edition, pp. 449-454.

A COMPROMISE SOLUTION FOR SOUTH VIET-NAM

1. A Losing War: The South Vietnamese are losing the war to the Viet Cong. No one can assure you that we can beat the Viet Cong or even force them to the conference table on our terms no matter how many hundred thousand white foreign (US) troops we deploy.

No one has demonstrated that a white ground force of whatever size can win a guerrilla war--which is at the same time a civil war between Asians--in jungle terrain in the midst of a population that refuses cooperation to the white forces (and the SVN) and thus provides a great intelligence advantage to the other side. Three recent incidents vividly illustrate this point:

(a) The sneak attack on the Danang Air Base which involved penetration of a defense perimeter guarded by 9,000 Marines. This raid was possible only because of the cooperation of the local inhabitants.

(b) The B-52 raid that failed to hit the Viet Cong who had obviously been tipped off.

(c) The search-and-destroy mission of the 173rd Airborne Brigade which spent three days looking for the Viet Cong, suffered 23 casualties, and never made contact with the enemy who had obviously gotten advance word of their assignment.

2. The Question to Decide: Should we limit our liabilities in South Viet-Nam and try to find a way out with minimal long-term costs?

The alternative--no matter what we may wish it to be--is almost certainly a protracted war involving an open-ended commitment of US forces, mounting US casualties, no assurance of a satisfactory solution, and a serious danger of escalation at the end of the road.

3. Need for a Decision Now: So long as our forces are restricted to advising and assisting the South Vietnamese, the struggle will remain a civil war between Asian peoples. Once we deploy substantial numbers of troops in combat it will become a war between the United States and a large part of the population of South Viet-Nam, organized and directed from North Viet-Nam and backed by the resources of both Moscow and Peiping.

The decision you face now, therefore, is crucial. Once large numbers of US troops are committed to direct combat they will begin to take heavy casualties in a war they are ill-equipped to fight in a non-cooperative if not downright hostile countryside.

Once we suffer large casualties we will have started a well-nigh irreversible process. Our involvement will be so great that we cannot--without national humiliation--stop short of achieving our complete objectives. Of the two possibilities I think humiliation would be more likely than the achievement of our objectives--even after we had paid terrible costs.

4. A Compromise Solution: Should we commit US manpower and prestige to a terrain so unfavorable as to give a very large advantage to the enemy--or should we seek a compromise settlement which achieves less than our stated objectives and thus cut our losses while we still have the freedom of maneuver to do so?

5. Costs of Compromise Solution: The answer involves a judgment as to the costs to the United States of such a compromise settlement in terms of our relations with the countries in the area of South Viet-Nam, the credibility of our commitments and our prestige around the world. In my judgment, if we act before we commit substantial US forces to combat in South Viet-Nam we can, by accepting some short-term costs, avoid what may well be a long-term catastrophe. I believe we have tended greatly to exaggerate the costs involved in a compromise settlement. An appreciation of probable costs is contained in the attached memorandum. (Tab A)

6. With these considerations in mind, I strongly urge the following program:

A. Military Program

(1) Complete all deployments already announced (15 battalions) but decide not to go beyond the total of 72,000 men represented by this figure.

(2) Restrict the combat role of American forces to the June 9 announcement,/2/ making it clear to General Westmoreland that this announcement is to be strictly construed.

/2/See Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, vol. II, Document 339.

(3) Continue bombing in the North but avoid the Hanoi-Haiphong area and any targets nearer to the Chinese border than those already struck.

B. Political Program

(1) In any political approaches so far, we have been the prisoners of whatever South Vietnamese Government was momentarily in power. If we are ever to move toward a settlement it will probably be because the South Vietnamese Government pulls the rug out from under us and makes its own deal or because we go forward quietly without advance pre-arrangement with Saigon.

(2) So far we have not given the other side a reason to believe that there is any flexibility in our negotiating approach. And the other side has been unwilling to accept what in their terms is complete capitulation.

(3) Now is the time to start some serious diplomatic feelers, looking towards a solution based on some application of the self-determination principle.

(4) I would recommend approaching Hanoi rather than any of the other probable parties (the National Liberation Front, Moscow or Peiping). Hanoi is the only one that has given any signs of interest in discussion. Peiping has been rigidly opposed. Moscow has recommended that we negotiate with Hanoi. The National Liberation Front has been silent.

(5) There are several channels to the North Vietnamese but I think the best one is through their representative in Paris, Mai Van Bo. Initial feelers with Bo should be directed toward a discussion both of the four points we have put forward and the four points put forward by Hanoi as a basis for negotiation. We can accept all but one of Hanoi's four points and hopefully we should be able to agree on some ground rules for serious negotiation--including no pre-conditions.

(6) If the initial feelers lead to further secret exploratory talks we can inject the concept of self-determination that would permit the Viet Cong some hope of achieving some of their political objectives through local elections or some other device.

(7) The contact on our side should be handled through a non-governmental cutout (possibly a reliable newspaperman who can be repudiated.)

(8) If progress can be made at this level the basis can be laid for a multi-national conference. At some point obviously the government of South Viet-Nam will have to be brought on board but I would postpone this step until after a substantial feeling out of Hanoi.

(9) Before moving to any formal conference we should be prepared to agree that once the conference is started (a) the United States will stand down its bombing of the North, (b) the South Vietnamese will initiate no offensive operations in the South, and (c) the DRV will stop terrorism and other aggressive acts in the South.

(10) Negotiations at the conference should aim at incorporating our understanding with Hanoi in the form of a multi-national agreement guaranteed by the United States, the Soviet Union and possibly other parties, and providing for an international mechanism to supervise its execution.

George W. Ball

Attachment A/3/

/3/Top Secret.

PROBABLE REACTIONS TO THE CUTTING OF OUR LOSSES IN SOUTH VIET-NAM

We have tended to exaggerate the losses involved in a compromise settlement in South Viet-Nam. There are three aspects of the problem which should be considered:

First, the local effect of our action on nations in or near Southeast Asia.

Second, the effect of our action on the credibility of our commitments around the world.

Third, the effect on our position of world leadership.

A. Effect on Nations in or Near Southeast Asia

Free Asian reactions to a compromise settlement in South Viet-Nam would be highly parochial, with each country interpreting the event primarily in terms of (a) its own immediate interest, (b) its sense of vulnerability to Communist invasion or insurgency, and (c) its confidence in the integrity of our commitment to its own security based on evidence other than that provided by our actions in SVN.

Within this framework, the following groupings emerge:

1. The Republic of China and Thailand, staunch allies whose preference for extreme U.S. actions, including a risk of war with Communist China, sets them apart from all other Asian nations;

2. The Republic of Korea and the Philippines, equally staunch allies whose support for strong U.S. actions short of a war with Communist China would make post-settlement reassurance a pressing U.S. need;

3. Japan, an ally that would prefer wisdom to valor in an area remote from its own interests where escalation could involve its Chinese or Russian neighbors, or both;

4. Laos, a friendly neutral dependent on a strong Thai-US guarantee of support in the face of increased Vietnamese-Pathet Lao pressures;

5. Burma and Cambodia, suspicious neutrals whose fear of antagonizing Communist China would increase their leaning toward Peking in a conviction that the US presence is not long for Southeast Asia; and

6. Indonesia, whose opportunistic marriage of convenience with both Hanoi and Peking would carry it further in its covert aggression against Malaysia, convinced that "foreign imperialism" is a fast fading entity in the region.

Of these varied reactions, the critical importance of Japan and Thailand calls for more detailed examination.

Japan

According to our Embassy, Japanese public opinion is largely unreceptive to our interpretation of the situation in Viet-Nam. Many if not most Japanese consider that the US is endeavoring to prop up a tottering government that lacks adequate indigenous support. Public media stress the civil war aspects of the struggle, portray Hanoi's resistance as determined and justified, and question our judgment as to the dangers of an eventual war with Communist China.

The government as such supports our strong posture in Viet-Nam but stops short at the idea of a war between the US and China. Governmental leadership can--to a considerable extent--influence the public reaction in Japan. Government cooperation would, therefore, be essential in making the following points to the Japanese people: (1) US support was given in full measure, as shown by our casualties, our expenditures, and our risk-taking; and (2) the US record in Korea shows the credibility of our commitment so far as Japan is concerned.

Thailand

Thai commitments to the struggles in Laos and South Viet-Nam are based upon a careful evaluation of the regional threat to Thailand's security. The Thais are confident that they can contain any threats from Indochina alone. They know, however, that they cannot withstand the massive power of Communist China without foreign assistance.

Unfortunately, the Thai view of the war has seriously erred in fundamental respects. They believe American power can do anything, both militarily and in terms of shoring up a Saigon regime. They now assume that we really could take over in Saigon and win the war if we felt we had to. If we should fail to do so the Thais would initially see it as a failure of US will.

Yet time is on our side, provided we employ it effectively. Thailand is an independent nation with a long national history and--unlike South Viet-Nam--an acute national consciousness. It has few domestic Communists and none of the instability that plagues its neighbors, Burma and Malaysia. Its one danger area, in the Northeast, is well in hand so far as preventive measures against insurgency are concerned. Securing the Mekong Valley will be critical in any long-run solution, whether by the partition of Laos, with Thai-US forces occupying the western half, or by some cover arrangement. Provided we are willing to make the effort, Thailand can be a foundation of rock and not a bed of sand on which to base our political-military commitment to Southeast Asia.

South Korea

As for the rest of the Far East, the only serious point of concern might be South Korea. But if we stop pressing the Koreans for more troops to Viet-Nam (the Vietnamese show no desire for additional Asian forces since it affronts their sense of pride) we may be able to cushion Korean reactions to a compromise in South Viet-Nam by the provision of greater military and economic assistance. In this regard, Japan can play a pivotal role now that it has achieved normal relations with South Korea.

B. Effect on the Credibility of Our Commitments Around the World

With the exception of the nations in the Southeast Asian area, a compromise settlement in South Viet-Nam should not have a major impact on the credibility of our commitments around the world. Quite possibly President de Gaulle will make propaganda about perfidious Washington, but even he will be inhibited by his much-heralded disapproval of our activities in South Viet-Nam.

Chancellor Erhard has told us privately that the people of Berlin would be concerned by a compromise settlement in South Viet-Nam. But this was hardly an original thought and I suspect he was telling us what he believed we would like to hear. After all, the confidence of the West Berliners will depend more on what they see on the spot than on news of events half way around the world. They have much to gain by the prevention of a confrontation between East and West elsewhere and by the gradual developments of a spirit of entente that might pave the way for ultimate reunification.

In my observation, the principal anxiety of our NATO allies is that we have become too preoccupied with an area which seems to them an irrelevance and may be tempted to neglect our NATO responsibilities. Moreover, they have a vested interest in an easier relationship between Washington and Moscow.

By and large, therefore, they would be inclined to regard a compromise solution in South Viet-Nam more as new evidence of American maturity and judgment than of American loss of face.

These would be the larger and longer-term reactions of the Europeans. In the short run, of course, we could expect some cat-calls from the sidelines and some vindictive pleasure on the part of Europeans jealous of American power. But that would, in my view, be a transient phenomenon with which we could live without sustained anguish.

Elsewhere around the world, I would see few unhappy implications for the credibility of our commitments. No doubt the Communists will try to gain propaganda value in Africa, but I cannot seriously believe that the Africans care too much about what happens in Southeast Asia.

Australia and New Zealand are, of course, special cases since they feel lonely in the far reaches of the Pacific. Yet even their concern is far greater with Malaysia than with South Viet-Nam, and the degree of their anxiety would be conditioned largely by expressions of our support for Malaysia.

C. Effect on Our Position of World Leadership

On balance I believe we would more seriously undermine the effectiveness of our world leadership by continuing the war and deepening our involvement than by pursuing a carefully plotted course toward a compromise solution. In spite of the number of powers that have--in response to our pleading--given verbal support from feelings of loyalty and dependence, we cannot ignore the fact that the war is vastly unpopular and that our role in it is perceptibly eroding the respect and confidence with which other nations regard us. We have not persuaded either our friends or allies that our further involvement is essential to the defense of freedom in the Cold War. Moreover, the more men we deploy in the jungles of South Viet-Nam, the more we contribute to the growing world anxiety and mistrust.

Document #13 - FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. III, document #67.
See: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_iii/060.html

67. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/

Washington, July 20, 1965.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XII. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. A list of comments on the memorandum, prepared by Lodge in Saigon on July 19, indicates that it was drafted by McNaughton on July 18. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, Box 2) U. Alexis Johnson sent his comments on the July 18 draft to McNaughton on July 19. (Ibid.)

SUBJECT

Recommendations of additional deployments to Vietnam

1. Introduction. Our object in Vietnam is to create conditions for a favorable outcome by demonstrating to the VC/DRV that the odds are against their winning. We want to create these conditions, if possible, without causing the war to expand into one with China or the Soviet Union and in a way which preserves support of the American people and, hopefully, of our allies and friends. The following assessments, made following my trip to Vietnam with Ambassador-designate Lodge and General Wheeler, are my own and are addressed to the achievement of that object. My specific recommendations appear in paragraph 5; they are concurred in by Ambassador Taylor, Ambassador-designate Lodge, Ambassador Johnson, General Wheeler, Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland. I have neither asked for nor obtained their concurrence in other portions of the paper./2/

/2/William Bundy discussed the memorandum with the other members of the group that accompanied McNamara to Vietnam, and found that "to a man they shared his estimate." After reading the report, Bundy noted that he also was forced to agree, "even though it meant accepting the chance that the war would be increasingly Americanized." (Johnson Library, Papers of William P. Bundy, Ch. 27, p. 26)

2. Favorable outcome. In my view, a "favorable outcome" for purposes of these assessments and recommendations has nine fundamental elements:

(a) VC stop attacks and drastically reduce incidents of terror and sabotage.

(b) DRV reduces infiltration to a trickle, with some reasonably reliable method of our obtaining confirmation of this fact.

(c) US/GVN stop bombing of North Vietnam.

(d) GVN stays independent (hopefully pro-US, but possibly genuinely neutral).

(e) GVN exercises governmental functions over substantially all of South Vietnam.

(f) Communists remain quiescent in Laos and Thailand.

(g) DRV withdraws PAVN forces and other North Vietnamese infiltrators (not regroupees) from South Vietnam.

(h) VC/NLF transform from a military to a purely political organization.

(i) US combat forces (not advisors or AID) withdraw.

A favorable outcome could include also arrangements regarding elections, relations between North and South Vietnam, participation in peace-keeping by international forces, membership for North and South Vietnam in the UN, and so on. The nine fundamental elements can evolve with or without an express agreement and, except for what might be negotiated incidental to a cease-fire, are more likely to evolve without an express agreement than with one. We do not need now to address the question whether ultimately we would settle for something less than the nine fundamentals; because deployment of the forces recommended in paragraph 5 is prerequisite to the achievement of any acceptable settlement, and a decision can be made later, when bargaining becomes a reality, whether to compromise in any particular.

3. Estimate of the situation. The situation in South Vietnam is worse than a year ago (when it was worse than a year before that). After a few months of stalemate, the tempo of the war has quickened. A hard VC push is now on to dismember the nation and to maul the army. The VC main and local forces, reinforced by militia and guerrillas, have the initiative and, with large attacks (some in regimental strength), are hurting ARVN forces badly. The main VC efforts have been in southern I Corps, northern and central II Corps and north of Saigon. The central highlands could well be lost to the National Liberation Front during this monsoon season. Since June 1, the GVN has been forced to abandon six district capitals; only one has been retaken. US combat troop deployments and US/VNAF strikes against the North have put to rest most South Vietnamese fears that the United States will foresake them, and US/VNAF air strikes in-country have probably shaken VC morale somewhat. Yet the government is able to provide security to fewer and fewer people in less and less territory as terrorism increases. Cities and towns are being isolated as fewer and fewer roads and railroads are usable and power and communications lines are cut.

The economy is deteriorating--the war is disrupting rubber production, rice distribution, Dalat vegetable production and the coastal fishing industry, causing the loss of jobs and income, displacement of people and frequent breakdown or suspension of vital means of transportation and communication; foreign exchange earnings have fallen; and severe inflation is threatened.

The odds are less than even that the Ky government will last out the year. Ky is "executive agent" for a directorate of generals. His government is youthful and inexperienced, but dedicated to a "revolutionary" program. His tenure depends upon unity of the armed forces behind him. If the directorate holds together and the downward trend of the war is halted, the religious and regional factions will probably remain quiescent; otherwise there will be political turbulence and possibly uncoordinated efforts to negotiate settlement with the DRV. The Buddhists, Catholics, out-politicians and business community are "wait-and-seeing;" the VC, while unable alone to generate effective unrest in the cities, can "piggy-back" on any anti-government demonstration or cause.

Rural reconstruction (pacification) even in the Hop Tac area around Saigon is making little progress. Gains in IV Corps are being held, but in I and II Corps and adjacent III Corps areas it has lost ground fast since the start of the VC monsoon offensive (300,000 people have been lost to the VC, and tens of thousands of refugees have poured out of these areas).

The Government-to-VC ratio over-all is now only a little better than 3-to-1, and in combat battalions little better than 1.5-to-1. Some ARVN units have been mauled; many are understrength and therefore "conservative." Desertions are at a high rate, and the force build-up has slipped badly. The VC, who are undoubtedly suffering badly too (their losses are very high), now control a South Vietnamese manpower pool of 500,000 to 1 million fighting-age men and reportedly are trying to double their combat strength, largely by forced draft (down to 15-year-olds) in the increasing areas they control. They seem to be able more than to replace their losses.

There are no signs that we have throttled the inflow of supplies for the VC or can throttle the flow while their materiel needs are as low as they are; indeed more and better weapons have been observed in VC hands, and it is probable that there has been further build-up of North Vietnamese regular units in the I and II Corps areas, with at least three full regiments (all of the 325th Division) there. Nor have our air attacks in North Vietnam produced tangible evidence of willingness on the part of Hanoi to come to the conference table in a reasonable mood. The DRV/VC seem to believe that South Vietnam is on the run and near collapse; they show no signs of settling for less than a complete take-over.

4. Options open to us. We must choose among three courses of action with respect to Vietnam all of which involve different probabilities, outcomes and costs:

(a) Cut our losses and withdraw under the best conditions that can be arranged--almost certainly conditions humiliating the United States and very damaging to our future effectiveness on the world scene.

(b) Continue at about the present level, with the US forces limited to say 75,000, holding on and playing for the breaks--a course of action which, because our position would grow weaker, almost certainly would confront us later with a choice between withdrawal and an emergency expansion of forces, perhaps too late to do any good.

(c) Expand promptly and substantially the US military pressure against the Viet Cong in the South and maintain the military pressure against the North Vietnamese in the North while launching a vigorous effort on the political side/3/ to lay the groundwork for a favorable outcome by clarifying our objectives and establishing channels of communication. This alternative would stave off defeat in the short run and offer a good chance of producing a favorable settlement in the longer run; at the same time it would imply a commitment to see a fighting war clear through at considerable cost in casualties and materiel and would make any later decision to withdraw even more difficult and even more costly than would be the case today.

/3/Ambassador Lodge states "any further initiative by us now [before we are strong] would simply harden the Communist resolve not to stop fighting." Ambassadors Taylor and Johnson would maintain discreet contacts with the Soviets, but otherwise agree with Ambassador Lodge. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]

My recommendations in paragraph 5 below are based on the choice of the third alternative (Option c) as the course of action involving the best odds of the best outcome with the most acceptable cost to the United States.

5. Military recommendations. There are now 15 US (and 1 Australian) combat battalions in Vietnam; they, together with other combat personnel and non-combat personnel, bring the total US personnel in Vietnam to approximately 75,000.

a. I recommend that the deployment of US ground troops in Vietnam be increased by October to 34 maneuver battalions (or, if the Koreans fail to provide the expected 9 battalions promptly, to 43 battalions). The battalions--together with increases in helicopter lift, air squadrons, naval units, air defense, combat support and miscellaneous log support and advisory personnel which I also recommend--would bring the total US personnel in Vietnam to approximately 175,000 (200,000 if we must make up for the Korean failure). It should be understood that the deployment of more men (an additional perhaps 100,000) may be necessary in early 1966, and that the deployment of additional forces thereafter is possible but will depend on developments.

b. I recommend that Congress be requested to authorize the call-up of approximately 235,000 men in the Reserve and National Guard. This number--approximately 125,000 Army, 75,000 Marines, 25,000 Air Force and 10,000 Navy--would provide approximately 36 maneuver battalions by the end of this year. The call-up would be for a two-year period; but the intention would be to release them after one year, by which time they could be relieved by regular forces if conditions permitted.

c. I recommend that the regular armed forces be increased by approximately 375,000 men (approximately 250,000 Army, 75,000 Marines, 25,000 Air Force and 25,000 Navy). This would provide approximately 27 additional maneuver battalions by the middle of 1966. The increase would be accomplished by increasing recruitment, increasing the draft and extending tours of duty of men already in the service.

d. I recommend that a supplemental appropriation of approximately $X for FY 1966 be sought from the Congress to cover the first part of the added costs attributable to the build-up in and for the war in Vietnam. A further supplemental appropriation might be required later in the fiscal year.

It should be noted that in mid-1966 the United States would, as a consequence of the above method of handling the build-up, have approximately 600,000 additional men (approximately 63 additional maneuver battalions) as protection against contingencies.

6. Use of forces. The forces will be used however they can be brought to bear most effectively. The US/third-country ground forces will operate in coordination with South Vietnamese forces. They will defend their own bases; they will assist in providing security in neighboring areas; they will augment Vietnamese forces, assuring retention of key logistic areas and population centers. Also, in the initial phase they will maintain a small reserve-reaction force, conducting nuisance raids and spoiling attacks, and opening and securing selected lines of communication; as in-country ground strength increases to a level permitting extended US and third-country offensive action, the forces will be available for more active combat missions when the Vietnamese Government and General Westmoreland agree that such active missions are needed. The strategy for winning this stage of the war will be to take the offensive--to take and hold the initiative. The concept of tactical operations will be to exploit the offensive, with the objects of putting the VC/DRV battalion forces out of operation and of destroying their morale. The South Vietnamese, US and third-country forces, by aggressive exploitation of superior military forces, are to gain and hold the initiative--keeping the enemy at a disadvantage, maintaining a tempo such as to deny them time to recuperate or regain their balance, and pressing the fight against VC/DRV main force units in South Vietnam to run them to ground and destroy them. The operations should combine to compel the VC/DRV to fight at a higher and more sustained intensity with resulting higher logistical consumption and, at the same time, to limit his capability to resupply forces in combat at that scale by attacking his LOC. The concept assumes vigorous prosecution of the air and sea anti-infiltration campaign and includes increased use of air in-country, including B-52s, night and day to harass VC in their havens. Following destruction of the VC main force units, the South Vietnamese must reinstitute the Program of Rural Reconstruction as an antidote to the continuing VC campaign of terror and subversion.

7. Actions against North Vietnam. We should continue the program of bombing military targets in North Vietnam. While avoiding striking population and industrial targets not closely related to the DRV's supply of war materiel to the VC, we should announce to Hanoi and carry out actions to destroy such supplies and to interdict their flow. The number of strike sorties against North Vietnam--against fixed targets and for armed reconnaissance--should increase slowly from the present level of 2,500 a month to 4,000 or more a month. We should be prepared at any time to carry out a severe reprisal should the VC or DRV commit a particularly damaging or horrendous act (e.g., VC interdiction of the Saigon river could call for a quarantine of DRV harbors, or VC assassination of a high-ranking US official could call for destruction of all of the major power plants in North Vietnam); the chances of our reprisal action leading to escalation is not large in such an instance. After the 44 US/third-country battalions have been deployed and after some strong action has been taken in the program of bombing the North (e.g., after the key railroad bridges north of Hanoi have been dropped), we could, as part of a diplomatic initiative, consider introducing a 6-8 week pause in the program of bombing the North.

8. Other actions in South Vietnam. The military program cannot do the job alone. Among others, the following actions should also be taken in South Vietnam.

a. Continue doggedly to "strengthen the rear" by pressing forward with the rural reconstruction (pacification) program, realizing both that the program has little chance of meaningful success unless and until security can be provided, and that the program is fundamental to full success once security is provided.

b. Keep working with the government in Saigon to make it more stable. Consider using the deployment of the US troops as the occasion to lay down some terms--e.g., regarding the presence and use of a US-controlled rice reserve, an effective US veto on major GVN military commanders, statements about invading North Vietnam, and so on.

c. Take steps to meet the economic shortages and disruptions. Especially, the recurring threat of rice inflation should be countered by the provision of an in-country US-controlled rice reserve.

d. Take informational actions to undermine VC morale by reference to VC defeats, to GVN/US weapon superiority, to air attacks on their bases, etc., and by encouraging VC to defect either to the government or "back home." In this connection, the Chieu Hoi program (to induce VC defections) must be revitalized immediately.

9. Expanded political moves./4/ Together with the above military moves, we should take political initiatives in order to lay a groundwork for a favorable political settlement by clarifying our objectives and establishing channels of communications. At the same time as we are taking steps to turn the tide in South Vietnam, we should make quiet moves through diplomatic channels (a) to open a dialogue with Moscow and Hanoi, and perhaps the VC, looking first toward disabusing them of any misconceptions as to our goals and second toward laying the groundwork for a settlement when the time is ripe; (b) to keep the Soviet Union from deepening its military involvement and support of North Vietnam and from generating crises elsewhere in the world until the time when settlement can be achieved; and (c) to cement support for US policy by the US public, allies and friends, and to keep international opposition at a manageable level. Our efforts may be unproductive until the tide begins to turn, but nevertheless they should be made.

/4/Note footnote to paragraph 4 (c). [Footnote in the source text.]

10. South Vietnamese reaction to expansion of US forces. Three factors dominate the psychological situation in South Vietnam: (a) the military situation (i.e., the security problem), (b) the effectiveness of the government as a vehicle for dynamic leadership, and (c) the implications of the growing American presence. The deployments recommended in paragraph 5 run some risk of causing the Vietnamese to "turn the war over to us" and of generating an "anti-colonial" type resentment toward us. The GVN has requested the additional US forces urgently (indeed, they want 9 battalions more than the 44 recommended here). When Ky was asked about the popular reaction, he said, "We will explain it to our people." Thieu agreed saying, "They know that you are not here to make us a colony." Former Prime Minister Quat told me, "The only way to save Vietnam is to send a large number of troops." He added, "The people of South Vietnam will not object." The spectres of widespread adverse public reaction have been raised each time we deployed personnel in the past, and, while no deployment has been so massive as this one, no such reaction appeared. Furthermore, the key requirement for continued viability of the Vietnamese spirit in the short run is evidence that RVNAF/US/third-country forces can contain the VC/DRV monsoon offensive and reopen communications; in the longer run the requirement will be evidence of bringing the war to a satisfactory close.

11. Communist reaction to the expanded program. The Soviets can be expected to continue material assistance to North Vietnam and to lodge verbal complaints, but not to intervene otherwise. The Chinese--at least so long as we do not invade North Vietnam, do not sink a Chinese ship and, most important, do not strike China--will probably not send regular ground forces or aircraft into the war. The DRV, on the other hand, may well send up to several divisions of regular forces in South Vietnam to assist the VC if they see the tide turning and victory, once so near, being snatched away. This possible DRV action is the most ominous one, since it would lead to increased pressures on us to "counter-invade" North Vietnam and to extend air strikes to population targets in the North; acceding to these pressures could bring the Soviets and the Chinese in. The Viet Cong, especially if they continue to take high losses, can be expected to depend increasingly upon the PAVN forces as the war moves into a more conventional phase; but they may find ways to continue almost indefinitely their present intensive military, guerrilla and terror activities, particularly if reinforced by some regular PAVN units. A key question on the military side is whether POL, ammunition, and cadres can be cut off and, if they are cut off, whether this really renders the Viet Cong impotent.

12. Evaluation. ARVN overall is not capable of successfully resisting the VC initiatives without more active assistance from more US/third-country ground forces than those thus far committed. Without further outside help, the ARVN is faced with successive tactical reverses, loss of key communication and population centers particularly inn the high-lands, piecemeal destruction of ARVN units, attrition of RVNAF will to fight, and loss of civilian confidence. Early commitment of additional US/third-country forces in sufficient quantity, in general reserve and offensive roles, should stave off GVN defeat.

The success of the program from the military point of view turns on whether the Vietnamese hold their own in terms of numbers and fighting spirit, and on whether the US forces can be effective in a quick-reaction reserve role, a role in which they are only now being tested. The number of US troops is too small to make a significant difference in the traditional 10-1 government-guerrilla formula, but it is not too small to make a significant difference in the kind of war which seems to be evolving in Vietnam--a "Third Stage" or conventional war in which it is easier to identify, locate and attack the enemy.

The plan is such that the risk of escalation into war with China or the Soviet Union can be kept small. US and South Vietnamese casualties will increase--just how much cannot be predicted with confidence, but the US killed-in-action might be in the vicinity of 500 a month by the end of the year. The South Vietnamese under one government or another will probably see the thing through/5/ and the United States public will support the course of action because it is a sensible and courageous military-political program designed and likely to bring about a success in Vietnam.

/5/Ambassador Lodge points out that we may face a neutralist government at some time in the future and that in those circumstances the US should be prepared to carry on alone. [Footnote in the source text.]

It should be recognized, however, that success against the larger, more conventional VC/PAVN forces could merely drive the VC back into the trees and back to their 1960-64 pattern--a pattern against which US troops and aircraft would be of limited value but with which the GVN, with our help, could cope. The questions here would be whether the VC could maintain morale after such a set-back, and whether the South Vietnamese would have the will to hang on through another cycle. It should be recognized also that, even in "success," it is not obvious how we will be able to disengage our forces from Vietnam. It is unlikely that a formal agreement good enough for the purpose could possibly be negotiated--because the arrangement can reflect little more than the power situation. A fairly large number of US (or perhaps "international") forces may be required to stay in Vietnam.

The overall evaluation is that the course of action recommended in this memorandum--if the military and political moves are properly integrated and executed with continuing vigor and visible determination--stands a good chance of achieving an acceptable outcome within a reasonable time in Vietnam.

Robert S. McNamara

Document #14 - FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. III, document #93.
See: http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_iii/090.html

93. Summary Notes of the 553d Meeting of the National Security Council/1/

Washington, July 27, 1965, 5:40 p.m.-6:20 p.m.

/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Meetings File, Vol. 3. Top Secret; Sensitive; For the President Only. Drafted by Bromley Smith. According to an attached list, the following attended the meeting: President Johnson, McNamara, Wheeler, McNaughton, Raborn, Helms, Rusk, Ball, Thompson, William Bundy, Lodge, Fowler, Rowan, Marks, McGeorge Bundy, Valenti, Busby, Goodwin, Moyers, Cater, Smith, and Katzenbach. Valenti and McGeorge Bundy also prepared notes of the meeting. (Ibid., Meeting Notes File, Box 1)

SUBJECT

Deployment of Additional U.S. Troops to Vietnam

The President: Before formalizing decisions on the deployment of additional U.S. forces to Vietnam, he wished to review the present situation with Council members present. Secretary Rusk will deal with the political situation and Secretary McNamara will describe the military situation.

Secretary Rusk:

1. The Chinese Communists are most adamant against any negotiations between the North Vietnamese and the U.S./South Vietnamese. The clash between the Chinese Communists and the Russians continues.
2. According to the Yugoslav Ambassador, Tito got the impression during his visit to Moscow that "things would happen" if we stopped the bombing of North Vietnam. We have asked many times what the North Vietnamese would do if we stopped the bombing. We have heard nothing to date in reply.
3. There appear to be elements of caution on the other side--in Hanoi as well as in Moscow. Our purpose is to keep our contacts open with the other side in the event that they have a new position to give us.
4. The U.S. actions we are taking should be presented publicly in a low key but in such a way as to convey accurately that we are determined to prevent South Vietnam from being taken over by Hanoi. At the same time, we seek to avoid a confrontation with either the Chinese Communists or the Soviet Union.

Secretary McNamara: Summarized the military situation in Vietnam:

1. The number of Viet Cong forces has increased and the percentage of these forces committed to battle has increased.
2. The geographic area of South Vietnam controlled by the Viet Cong has increased.
3. The Viet Cong have isolated the cities and disrupted the economy of South Vietnam. The cities are separated from the countryside.
4. Increased desertions from the South Vietnamese Army have prevented an increase in the total number of South Vietnamese troops available for combat.
5. About half of all U.S. Army helicopters are now in South Vietnam in addition to over 500 U.S. planes.

The military requirements are:

1. More combat battalions from the U.S. are necessary. A total of 13 additional battalions need to be sent now. On June 15, we announced a total of 75,000 men, or 15 battalions.
2. A total of 28 battalions is now necessary.
3. Over the next 15 months, 350,000 men would be added to regular U.S. forces.
4. In January, we would go to Congress for a supplementary appropriation to pay the costs of the Vietnam war. We would ask now for a billion, in addition to the existing 1966 budget. (Draft plan is attached as Tab A.)/2/

/2/Not attached and not found.

The attack on the SAM sites in North Vietnam was necessary to protect our planes. Attacks on other priority targets in North Vietnam are required.

Ambassador Lodge: Asked whether the ratio of government to guerrilla ground forces had to be 10:1. During his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he had been asked this question. Comment had been made about the astronomical size of U.S. forces required if this traditional 10:1 ratio was valid.

General Wheeler: The mobility and fire power of U.S. and South Vietnamese forces has put an imponderable element into the traditional ratio of 10:1. Perhaps 4:1 is the right ratio.

With the additional forces to be sent to South Vietnam, General Westmoreland believes we can hold our present position and possibly move back into areas now contested. The one exception would be in the Fourth Corps.

Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara expressed differences of view concerning a map brought to the meeting by Secretary McNamara which purported to show the amount of territory in South Vietnam controlled by the Viet Cong. Secretary Rusk thought the map overstated the size of Viet Cong controlled areas. Secretary McNamara said it understated the area they control. At least 26% of the population of South Vietnam is controlled by Viet Cong, according to Secretary McNamara's figures.

(The meeting was interrupted briefly to permit the photographers to take pictures.)

The President: The situation in Vietnam is deteriorating. Even though we now have 80 to 90,000 men there, the situation is not very safe. We have these choices:

1. Use our massive power, including SAC, to bring the enemy to his knees. Less than 10% of our people urge this course of action.
2. We could get out on the grounds that we don't belong there. Not very many people feel this way about Vietnam. Most feel that our national honor is at stake and that we must keep our commitments there./3/

/3/According to Valenti's notes of the meeting, Johnson also said at this point: "Ike, Kennedy and I have given commitment."

1. We could keep our forces at the present level, approximately 80,000 men, but suffer the consequences of losing additional territory and of accepting increased casualties./4/ We could "hunker up". No one is recommending this course.

/4/Valenti's notes indicate the President said at this point: "You wouldn't want your boy to be out there and crying for help and not get it."

1. We could ask for everything we might desire from Congress--money, authority to call up the reserves, acceptance of the deployment of more combat battalions. This dramatic course of action would involve declaring a state of emergency and a request for several billion dollars. Many favor this course. However, if we do go all out in this fashion, Hanoi would be able to ask the Chinese Communists and the Soviets to increase aid and add to their existing commitments.
2. We have chosen to do what is necessary to meet the present situation, but not to be unnecessarily provocative to either the Russians or the Communist Chinese. We will give the commanders the men they say they need and, out of existing materiel in the U.S., we will give them the materiel they say they need. We will get the necessary money in the new budget and will use our transfer authority until January. We will neither brag about what we are doing nor thunder at the Chinese Communists and the Russians./5/

/5/Valenti notes that Johnson added at this point that the United States should say to Thieu: "You and your military help us there and make what gains we can. Meanwhile, we will explore ways to find peace."

This course of action will keep us there during the critical monsoon season and possibly result in some gains. Meanwhile, we will push on the diplomatic side. This means that we will use up our manpower reserves. We will not deplete them, but there will be a substantial reduction. Quietly, we will push up the level of our reserve force./6/ We will let Congress push us but, if necessary, we will call the legislators back.

/6/Valenti notes that Johnson added that the United States could not draw down its reserves for long if challenged on another front.

We will hold until January. The alternatives are to put in our big stack now or hold back until Ambassadors Lodge and Goldberg and the diplomats can work./7/

/7/According to Valenti's notes, Johnson said that the decision narrowed down in his mind to the options he outlined in paragraphs d and e.

Secretary Fowler: Do we ask for standby authority now to call the reserves but not actually call them?

The President: Under the approved plan, we would not ask for such authority now./8/

/8/Valenti notes that Johnson added: "If Russia, England, etc. wouldn't get all excited about calling up reserves, I would do it right now."

There was no response when the President asked whether anyone in the room opposed the course of action decided upon./9/

/9/In his memorandum of the meeting, prepared on November 2, 1968, from his handwritten notes dated July 27, 1965, McGeorge Bundy included the following statement: "The notes also record my own feeling that while the President was placing his preference for alternative five [e.], as against alternative four [d.], on international grounds, his unspoken object was to protect his legislative program--or at least this had appeared to be his object in his informal talk as late as Thursday and Friday of the preceding week--July 22, and July 23."

Bromley Smith

Document #15 - "Real Player" video file of LBJ's March 31, 1968 national address, in which he announced he would not seek the Democratic Party's nomination for the 1968 presidential election. From Lyndon B. Johnson Library and Museum. See:
http://oak.lbjlib.utexas.edu/website/streaming-index.html